



Nationalism and withdrawals from intergovernmental organizations: Connecting theory and data

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Abstract

von Borzyskowski and Vabulas' *Review of International Organizations* 14(2):335-366 (2019) pioneering research explores why states withdraw from intergovernmental organizations (IGOs). Contrary to popular belief, the research finds that IGO withdrawal has little to do with increased nationalism and instead is largely driven by geopolitical reasons and democracy levels both within the state and organization. In this study, I test von Borzyskowski and Vabulas' empirical analysis by the introduction of an alternative measure of leader nationalism that more closely matches their theoretical argument. With this alternative nationalism measure, I find strong evidence consistent with popular belief: nationalism is a key driving force for IGO withdrawals across space and time.

Keywords Nationalism · Political Leaders · Withdrawals from Intergovernmental Organizations · Popular Belief · Connecting Theory and Data

von Borzyskowski and Vabulas (2019) offer pioneering research examining why states withdraw from intergovernmental organizations (IGOs). Their key contribution is to challenge the popular belief that states withdraw their IGO memberships due to increased nationalism (e.g., Brexit and the U.S. withdrawal from UNESCO). Their research casts doubt on the relationship between nationalism and IGO withdrawal “because nationalism explanations usually do not take into account that states have been withdrawing from IGOs for decades and because the *causes* underlying nationalism may provide a better explanation for IGO withdrawals” (p. 336, original emphasis). Based on an original dataset of 493 IGOs for the years 1945 to 2014, their research finds that, contrary to popular belief, IGO withdrawals are not a function of nationalism and are instead mostly explained by geopolitical variables and democracy levels both within the state and within the organization.

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For their empirical analysis, von Borzyskowski and Vabulas employ an indicator for nationalism, “coded ‘1’ when the primary component of any party platform (executive, government, or opposition) is the creation or defense of a national or ethnic identity, and ‘0’ otherwise” (p. 351). I contend that this focus on party platforms is not optimal for capturing policy decisions made by political leaders regarding IGO withdrawals. This is acknowledged by the authors themselves in their theoretical discussion. After reporting the null finding on nationalism’s effect on IGO withdrawals, the authors explain “while there may indeed be rising nationalism among the populace, public opinion with regard to foreign policy does not always translate directly into politicians’ *vote shares* or *actions*” (pp. 336–337, original emphasis). This explanation highlights the significance of political leaders—not political parties—who exploit nationalism as “a tool...to bolster their authority” and who withdraw from IGOs due to their nationalist politics (quoted in von Borzyskowski and Vabulas 2019, 361).

I believe that von Borzyskowski and Vabulas’ findings can be tested by the use of an alternative measure of nationalism which more closely matches their theoretical explanation. I suggest that to robustly validate the role of political actors in their causal story, von Borzyskowski and Vabulas look for an alternative variable that captures nationalist feelings at the leadership level rather than the political party level. It makes theoretical sense that political leaders such as presidents and prime ministers who imbue the nation with nationalist sentiments in order to shore up their own legitimacy and win popular support would seek to withdraw from IGOs (Foa 2016; Mylonas and Kuo 2018; Snyder 2019). Leaders, who have taken a nationalist foreign policy stance in office, should be more inclined to preserve the autonomy of their foreign policy-making process from IGO influence than leaders who are not nationalist (Gordenker 1969). Nationalist leaders tend to perceive that IGOs “impinge on national sovereignty and expose the country to the dangers of foreign influence...[IGOs also] represent the preferences of globalized elites” (Copelovitch and Pevehouse 2019, 178). With this perception, nationalist leaders are likely to withdraw their memberships to clearly signal their preference for policy independence. This is what happened in 1955, when Governor-General Earnest Jansen of South Africa withdrew from UNESCO after the organization circulated anti-apartheid publications. Von Borzyskowski and Vabulas discuss Donald Trump’s nationalist politics by citing Fukuyama (2016):

President Trump’s nationalism both on economic policy and the global political system means that “he will seek to renegotiate existing trade agreements such as NAFTA and presumably the WTO, and if he doesn’t get what he wants, he is willing to contemplate exiting from them.”

I concur with von Borzyskowski and Vabulas’ theoretical point underscoring the critical role of nationalist political leaders in IGO withdrawal politics. I propose that von Borzyskowski and Vabulas’ empirical findings, if they are robust, should be validated using an alternative measure of nationalism. In the meantime, I note that their dichotomous measure of nationalism focusing on political party platforms fails to account for the role played by nationalist leaders in IGO withdrawal decisions. In this context, von Borzyskowski and Vabulas’ research risks measurement error—the theoretical concept and the nationalism variable do not align well with each other (Choi 2016; King et al. 1994; von Borzyskowski and Wahman 2021).

1 Reproducing von Borzyskowski and Vabulas' research

This section consists of three parts. The first part briefly summarizes von Borzyskowski and Vabulas' research design and introduces an alternative measure of nationalism at the leadership level. The second part presents reproduced results of von Borzyskowski and Vabulas' research. The third part provides several robustness checks.

1.1 Research design

von Borzyskowski and Vabulas' research builds a logistic regression model as follows:

$$\begin{aligned}
 IGO\ Withdrawal_{mit} = & \beta_0 + \beta_1 * Democracy_{mit-1} \\
 & + \beta_2 * Government\ Orientation\ Change_{mit-1} \\
 & + \beta_3 * Nationalist_{mit-1} + \beta_4 * IO\ Institutionalization_{mit-1} \\
 & + \beta_5 * IO\ Average\ Democracy\ Score_{mit-1} \\
 & + \beta_6 * IO\ Issue\ Area\ Politics_{mit-1} \\
 & + \beta_7 * IO\ Issue\ Area\ Economics_{mit-1} \\
 & + \beta_8 * Preference\ Divergence\ from\ the\ IO\ Average_{mit-1} \\
 & + \beta_9 * Contagion_{mit-1} + \beta_{10} * State\ Power\ Change_{mit-1} \\
 & + \beta_{11} * Membership\ Duration\ in\ IO_{mit-1} + \beta_{12} * IO\ Size_{mit-1} \\
 & + \varepsilon_{mit}
 \end{aligned}$$

where subscript m and $i = 1, \dots, N$ indicates member states and intergovernmental organizations, and subscript $t = 1, \dots, T$ indexes the time period. This suggests that the unit of analysis is the IGO-member state-year. $IGO\ Withdrawal_{mit}$ is the dependent variable, β_0 is an intercept term, β_1 through β_{12} are coefficients for independent variables, and ε_{mit} is an error term. To alleviate a possibility of endogeneity, the model lags all variables on the right-hand side by one year ($t-1$) behind that in which IGO withdrawal is explained (t). The model is likely to be subject to random measurement error caused by any factors that randomly affect measurement of variables. Random measurement error may have caused von Borzyskowski and Vabulas' nationalism variable to become insignificant.

An IGO withdrawal is coded as '1' when member state m withdrew from IGO i in year t and '0' otherwise. Since the occurrence of IGO withdrawals is not very common, rare event logit is chosen as the estimation method. To control for temporal dependence, the model employs Carter and Signorino's (2010) cubic polynomial approximation.

The logit model includes three groups of independent variables: a state's domestic politics, IGO characteristics, and geopolitics. The first group—a state's domestic politics—includes a state's level of democracy (measured by the Polity composite democracy scores), change in government orientation (obtained from the Database of Political Institutions), and nationalism (obtained from the Database of Political Institutions).

For the three domestic politics variables, I provide a detailed explanation on nationalism, the main focus of von Borzyskowski and Vabulas' research. As noted, von Borzyskowski and Vabulas' nationalism variable is dichotomous, coded '1' when any party platform, whether in the executive branch, government coalitions, or the opposition is nationalist.¹ This nationalism variable is less than ideal to capture a state's willingness to withdraw its membership from IGOs. For example, it is difficult to imagine that an opposition party's demand for withdrawal from an IGO would translate into an official government policy. The opposition would struggle to convince heads of state such as presidents or prime ministers, especially when the latter have no desire to pull the nation out of IGOs. Accordingly, it is less likely that a state would withdraw its IGO membership just because an opposition party demands it. It is more likely that IGO withdrawal would be made when top-level leadership choose to take action against international entities. In addition, party platforms may say one thing and parties do another. For example, the current platform of the Republican Party in the U.S. does not specify anything related to the "America First" approach, but Donald Trump has played the nationalist card since his inauguration (e.g., the withdrawal from the World Health Organization).

After explaining the operationalization of the nationalism variable, von Borzyskowski and Vabulas indicate typical examples of nationalist parties that "include Austria since 1984, where the far-right and center-right parties (FPÖ, ÖVP) have been involved in every government" (p. 351). But the notion that nationalism is limited to the political right does not reflect reality. Countries such as Spain and Russia have experienced a rise of nationalist leftist parties (see Lancaster and Lewis-Beck 1989). Thus, it is important that any discussion on the effect of nationalism acknowledges potential influence from both the right and left when political parties are conceived of as affecting state withdrawals from IGOs.

von Borzyskowski and Vabulas' theory is not closely linked to their empirical analysis, which risks violating King et al.'s (1994, 29) proposition that "theory and empirical research must be tightly connected." Or, as in von Borzyskowski and Wahman's (2021, 2) study, von Borzyskowski and Vabulas should consider potential "measurement error [that] concerns the relationship between an observed variable and a specific concept it is intended to capture." von Borzyskowski and Vabulas' findings could be bolstered by a direct measure for nationalism at the leadership level that can tightly link the theory and empirical analysis together.

Departing from von Borzyskowski and Vabulas's party-based nationalism variable based on party platforms, I propose an alternative measure of nationalism that captures the nationalist politics of leaders such as presidents and prime ministers. My reproduction analysis focuses on leader-based nationalism with data gathered from the Varieties of Democracy (V-Dem) Project (2019).² Existing studies define nationalism as an ideology that emphasizes the congruence of the nation and the state (e.g., Gellner 1983; see also Ko 2017). Conceptually, the variable assesses to what extent leaders

¹ The nationalism variable is different from change in government orientation that captures preferences regarding greater or less state control of the economy—the standard left-right scale. The change in government orientation variable is dichotomous, coded '1' when state economic policy changed between left and right and '0' otherwise.

² The V-Dem project is one of the largest-ever social science data collections and received the 2016 Lijphart/Przeworski/Verba Dataset Award. For more information, see <https://www.v-dem.net/en/>.

promote nationalism to increase their legitimacy. It is constructed from two expert survey questions.³ The first is “to what extent does the current government promote a specific ideology or societal model (an officially codified set of beliefs used to justify a particular set of social, political, and economic relations; for example, socialism, nationalism, religious traditionalism, etc.) in order to justify the regime in place?”⁴ The second is “how would you characterize the ideology/ideologies identified in the previous question?” This gives the expert the option to indicate whether any of the five types of ideology were present (1 = yes, 0 = no): nationalist, socialist or communist, restorative or conservative, separatist or autonomist, and religious. The measure then aggregates the answers via averaging, taking values between 0 and 1. Those categories are not mutually exclusive as a government may, for example, promote both religion and nationalism to justify the regime (e.g., Israel and Iran). Among the five ideologies, I choose the nationalism variable (*v2exl_legitideolcr_0*) for this reproduction study. The variable is continuous, fluctuating between 0 (lowest nationalism) and 1 (highest nationalism).⁵ The variable reflects the degree to which leaders provide justifications for nationalism but not how individual citizens view the legitimacy of their leaders whose authority is anchored in nationalist politics. The variable provides a conceptually robust measure of leader-based nationalism in line with von Borzyskowski and Vabulas’s theory.

The continuous leader-based nationalism variable has a mean of 0.4733, a standard deviation of 0.2926, a minimum value of 0, and a maximum value of 1. The variable takes non-zero values for about 84% of the sample data. The dichotomous party-based nationalism variable has a mean of 0.1796, a standard deviation of 0.3839, a minimum value of 0, and a maximum value of 1. The variable takes non-zero values for about 18% of the data.⁶

Using the example of Ronald Reagan’s presidency from 1981 to 1989, I further explain how leader-based nationalism is different from party-based nationalism. “Reaganism was...nationalist” (Troy 2005, 4). Similarly, Weiss et al. (2019, 501) note that “Ronald Reagan and George W. Bush started their presidencies with anti-UN rhetoric—less toxic than Trump’s, but hostile—along with vigorous unilateralism in other aspects of foreign policy.” In the sample data, the leader-based nationalism variable has a value of 0.857 during the Ronald Reagan presidency. The party-based nationalism variable has a value of 0 for the same period since President Reagan’s Republican Party had no nationalist party plank. For the Donald Trump presidency, the V-Dem Project (2019) assigns 1 to the leader-based nationalism variable, while von Borzyskowski and Vabulas’ study would assign 0 to the party-based nationalism variable. Since political leaders rather than party platforms are likely to have the final say about IGO withdrawals, the leader-based nationalism variable more closely captures what von Borzyskowski and Vabulas’ study originally lays out in the causal story.

³ See V-Dem Codebook V.10 (2010, 208) in <https://www.v-dem.net/en/data/reference-materials-v10/> (see also Tannenberget al. 2019).

⁴ The government includes the chief executive, the cabinet, ministries, and top civil servants (V-Dem Codebook V.102010, 208).

⁵ Note that the leader-based nationalism variable measures nationalism across space and time, irrespective of whether countries become more nationalistic in the lead-up to conflict or in the midst of international tensions.

⁶ The dichotomous dependent variable, IGO withdrawals, has a mean of 0.0004, a standard deviation of 0.0200, a minimum value of 0, and a maximum value of 1. The variable takes non-zero values about 4%.

Back to von Borzyskowski and Vabulas' model specification, the second group of independent variables—IGO characteristics, consists of four variables: IO institutionalization, IO average democracy score, IO performance, and issue area. IO institutionalization indicates the level of independent decision-making power, central monitoring, and enforcement capacity of the IGO. IO average democracy score is a count of IGOs whose average democracy score is at or above 7 on the Polity scale (which goes from -10 to 10), excluding the relevant state itself. IO performance evaluates the level to which the organization is accountable to stakeholders and achieves its objectives efficiently. Finally, issue area assesses whether the IGO focuses on political, economic, or security issues (the reference category is security).

The third group of independent variables, geopolitics, includes a state's preference divergence from the IO average, contagion, and change in state power. Preference divergence from the IO average captures the differences between a state's voting in the U.N. and the average voting behavior of the other states in the IGO in question. Contagion captures situations in which the largest economic member measured as GDP withdrew from the organization in question. Finally, change in state power is the difference in national military capabilities in the Composite Index of National Capability scores from the previous to the current year.

As the baseline IO characteristics, length of state membership in IO and IO size are controlled for across logit models.

1.2 Reproduction results

I reproduce the main table of von Borzyskowski and Vabulas' research (p. 355, Table 1) using both their original measure of party-based nationalism and my new measure of leader-based nationalism. The main table displays four rare event logit models. The first model is built to examine the effects of domestic-level variables; the second and third models evaluate the effects of IGO-level variables and geopolitics variables, respectively; and the last and fourth model is a full model that includes all twelve predictors. Since Models 1 and 4 are the only models that include nationalism, the variable of interest, I choose to reproduce the two.⁷

Table 1 displays reproduced coefficients and standard errors generated by rare event logit models. This table consists of six models. Models 1 and 4 are the reproduction of von Borzyskowski and Vabulas' domestic and all models (that includes all the variables pertaining to domestic, IGO characteristics, and geo-politics); Models 2 and 5 are re-estimated results that are obtained after replacing von Borzyskowski and Vabulas' party-based nationalism with leader-based nationalism; and Models 3 and 6 compare the leader-based nationalism variable and the party-based nationalism variable.

Thanks to the reproduction materials that are posted in the Harvard Dataverse Repository,⁸ I successfully reproduce von Borzyskowski and Vabulas' research. Consistent with their findings, I observe no significant effect of the nationalism variable in both Models 1 and 4 in Table 1. Concerning this null finding, the authors assert that “while increasing nationalism and populism are often cited in explanations of recent

⁷ Models 2 and 3 are not relevant for this reproduction analysis since they include control variables related exclusively to IGO characteristics and geo-politics, but not to nationalism.

⁸ See <https://dataverse.harvard.edu/dataset.xhtml?persistentId=doi:10.7910/DVN/KFA0AD>.

Table 1 Nationalism and IGO Withdrawals

Variable	Domestic			All		
	Reproduced	Mine	Together	Reproduced	Mine	Together
	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4	Model 5	Model 6
Democracy	0.056* (0.029)	0.069** (0.033)	0.068** (0.032)	0.060** (0.025)	0.063** (0.029)	0.053* (0.028)
Government orientation change	0.333 (0.270)	0.340 (0.273)	0.337 (0.269)	0.553* (0.301)	0.575* (0.295)	0.549* (0.301)
Nationalism (von Borzyskowski and Vabulas)	0.090 (0.467)		-0.042 (0.471)	-0.496 (0.619)		-0.722 (0.635)
Nationalism (Leader-Based)		1.493*** (0.341)	1.502*** (0.338)		1.183*** (0.387)	1.309*** (0.403)
IO institutionalization				-0.180 (0.334)	-0.185 (0.328)	-0.190 (0.330)
IO average democracy score				-0.093** (0.039)	-0.089** (0.040)	-0.089** (0.040)
IO issue area politics				-0.542 (0.688)	-0.576 (0.685)	-0.569 (0.686)
IO issue area economics				0.511 (0.435)	0.504 (0.440)	0.512 (0.438)
Preference diversion from IO average				1.175*** (0.207)	1.142*** (0.179)	1.088*** (0.197)
Contagion				3.166*** (0.438)	3.209*** (0.433)	3.209*** (0.435)
State power change				-0.911 (0.930)	-0.748 (0.795)	-0.735 (0.783)
Membership duration in IO	0.543 (0.385)	0.524 (0.364)	0.522 (0.366)	0.199 (0.568)	0.268 (0.531)	0.242 (0.533)
IO size	-0.223 (0.234)	-0.244 (0.223)	-0.241 (0.231)	-0.645** (0.317)	-0.638** (0.296)	-0.614** (0.305)
Observations	207,830	207,077	207,077	152,158	151,521	151,521
AIC	1456.366	1441.858	1443.811	972.498	967.013	966.203
BIC	1548.566	1534.026	1546.219	1131.421	1125.869	1134.988

Notes: Rare events logit models with robust standard errors clustered on IGO in parentheses. * $p < 0.10$; ** $p < 0.05$; *** $p < 0.01$

cases such as Brexit and US withdrawal from UNESCO, nationalism is not an important driving factor for IGO withdrawals across time and space” (p. 357).

When I employ my leader-based nationalism variable in place of von Borzyskowski and Vabulas’ party-based one in Models 2 and 5, I see a drastically different picture. My leader-based nationalism variable is statistically significant and in the expected direction. This implies that nationalist leaders are indeed more likely to withdraw from IGOs than their non-nationalist counterparts, which is in line with the popular belief on the relationship between nationalism and IGO withdrawal.

As noted, von Borzyskowski and Vabulas’ nationalism variable is based on nationalist orientation stated in party platforms, while mine measures the nationalist politics

of leaders. I re-emphasize that party platforms do not robustly capture the withdrawal politics of policy decision makers. It is possible that the two measures may represent two different causal paths exerting independent effects on IGO withdrawals.⁹ This possibility is tested in Models 3 and 6. The results show that while the party-based nationalism variable still has no bearing on IGO withdrawals, the leader-based nationalism variable exerts a significant and positive influence.

To visualize the estimated results, I plot average marginal/substantive effects in Fig. 1 based on log odds of full Models 4 and 6 in Table 1. To avoid clogging the figure with too many predictors, I confine it to seven: democracy, two nationalism variables, IO average democracy score, preference divergence from the IO average, contagion, and state power change. This takes into consideration von Borzyskowski and Vabulas' (2019, 335) contention: "we find that nationalism is not the key driver of IGO withdrawals in the past. Instead, we show that geopolitical factors—such as preference divergence and contagion—are the main factors linked to IGO withdrawals, followed by democracy levels in the country and organization."

Average marginal effect is the average of predicted changes in fitted values for one unit change in Y (if it is continuous) for each X value, i.e., for each observation. Since rare event logit regression is non-linear in nature, the effect differs from observation to observation. Figure 1 illustrates that the marginal/substantive effect of the leader-based nationalism variable is large, while that of the party-based nationalism variable is insignificant. Contagion, one of the geopolitics-related variables, also has a large substantive effect on IGO withdrawals. In short, the average marginal/substantive effects do not deviate from the significance tests, giving further credence to the robustness of the main findings of this reproduction study.

1.3 Robustness checks

I perform robustness checks regarding the main finding: while von Borzyskowski and Vabulas' party-based nationalism is not a significant predictor of IOG withdrawals, my leader-based nationalism is. I examine how party and leader-based nationalism variables behave when the regression specification is modified by adding new predictors.

Von Borzyskowski and Vabulas' party-based nationalism may be constructed too broadly since it combines executive, government, and opposition nationalism together. To assuage this concern, I narrow it down to the government's nationalism, eliminating executive and opposition nationalism from the variable. Using the Database of Political Institutions 2017,¹⁰ the original source of von Borzyskowski and Vabulas' study, I create a variable for government nationalism. Models 1 and 4 in Table 2 display the estimated results. Government nationalism does not emerge as a significant predictor, and more importantly does not cause my leader-based nationalism to become insignificant.

The insignificance of von Borzyskowski and Vabulas' party-based nationalism variable may be the result of incorporating right and left nationalism into a single

⁹ The correlation between the two variables is 0.18. Given that each variable measures a different feature of nationalism, the low correlation is not surprising. While von Borzyskowski and Vabulas' variable is party platform-based and conflated by combining executive, government, and opposition nationalism, mine is leader-based and focuses on actual policy decision makers.

¹⁰ See <https://mydata.iadb.org/Reform-Modernization-of-the-State/Database-of-Political-Institutions-2017/938i-s2bw>.




Fig. 1 Average Marginal Effects

index. I check this possible bias by distinguishing between right and left nationalism based on the Database of Political Institutions 2017. I divide von Borzyskowski and Vabulas' party-based nationalism variable into right and left nationalism variables. The results are shown in Model 2.¹¹ The differentiation of right and left nationalism does not much affect my leader-based nationalism variable, which still achieves significance. Note that neither right nor left nationalism emerges as a significant determinant of IGO withdrawal.

No economic variables are included in the empirical models, yet it is plausible that economic factors such as unemployment rate and economic growth may influence both the election of nationalist leaders and a country's withdrawal decision from international organizations. Unfavorable economic conditions may prompt leaders to introduce protection measures against international entities, thereby making IGO withdrawals more likely. To address this concern, I incorporate two economic variables in Model 3 in Table 2: unemployment and economic growth. These economic variables are not significantly different from zero, while my leader-based nationalism variable remains significant.

2 Conclusion

In this study, I re-evaluate the empirical claims made in von Borzyskowski and Vabulas' research regarding the effect of nationalism on IGO withdrawal. Contrary to the popular belief that nationalism drives state withdrawal from IGO memberships, von Borzyskowski and Vabulas' research finds no supporting empirical evidence. I speculate that the null finding may be due to a disconnect between theory and the

¹¹ The sample size of Model 5 is smaller than that of Model 2 since the former employs full model specification that includes all the variables from the state's domestic politics, IGO characteristics, and geopolitics. The smaller sample size leads to a lack of variation and a failure of producing estimated results.

Table 2 Nationalism and IGO Withdrawals: Robustness Checks

Variable	Domestic				All	
	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4	Model 5	Model 6
Democracy	0.074** (0.032)	0.076** (0.032)	0.085** (0.036)	0.060** (0.028)	not estimated	not estimated
Government orientation change	0.343 (0.272)	0.343 (0.271)	0.286 (0.299)	0.593** (0.296)		
Government's Nationalism	-0.548 (0.660)			-1.075 (0.796)		
Right Nationalism		-0.509 (0.648)	-0.325 (0.666)			
Left Nationalism		-0.410 (1.006)	-0.236 (1.009)			
Nationalism (Leader-Based)	1.627*** (0.328)	1.547*** (0.343)	1.887*** (0.357)	1.326*** (0.397)		
Unemployment			-8.589 (5.989)			
Economic Growth			-0.002 (0.057)			
IO institutionalization				-0.190 (0.332)		
IO average democracy score				-0.091** (0.042)		
IO issue area politics				-0.560 (0.686)		
IO issue area economics				0.491 (0.438)		
Preference diversion from IO average				1.101*** (0.184)		
Contagion				3.185*** (0.436)		
State power change				-0.727 (0.744)		
Membership duration in IO	0.484 (0.380)	0.529 (0.365)	0.445 (0.422)	0.164 (0.559)		
IO size	-0.222 (0.233)	-0.252 (0.228)	-0.247 (0.252)	-0.577* (0.303)		
Observations	198,994	204,379	173,349	146,189		
AIC	1402.937	1423.009	1308.027	945.087		
BIC	1504.948	1535.514	1438.846	1113.262		

Notes: Rare events logit models with robust standard errors clustered on IGO in parentheses. * $p < 0.10$; ** $p < 0.05$; *** $p < 0.01$

measurement of nationalism. To test the robustness of von Borzyskowski and Vabulas' findings, I introduce an alternative measure of nationalism at the leadership level instead at the party level. Although not perfect, the leader-based nationalism variable more closely reflects the original theoretical argument put forward by von

Borzyskowski and Vabulas. This reproduction study indicates that when the measurement error of the party-based nationalism variable is no longer an issue, there is a significant and positive effect of nationalism on IGO withdrawal. When nationalist political leaders desire greater autonomy in foreign policy decision-making, they are more likely to withdraw from IGOs that are not compatible with their national interests. The popular belief is upheld while von Borzyskowski and Vabulas' contention on party-based nationalism is not.

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