Democracy and Conflict Management: Territorial Claims in the Western Hemisphere Revisited

PATRICK JAMES
University of Southern California

JOHANN PARK
Michigan State University

SEUNG-WHAN CHOI
University of Illinois at Chicago

Research confirms that interdemocratic conflicts are more likely to be resolved peacefully. However, do the usual results hold up for especially contentious issues such as territory? We use issue correlates of war (ICOW) data from 1816 to 1992 to build on Hensel (2001) and related studies to investigate the relationships between and among democracy, conflict management, and territory as an issue. The results create a puzzle for the democratic or neo-Kantian peace: When territory is at stake, issue-related variables come to the fore and matter more than regime type in explaining states’ settlement strategies. The most important finding is that war experience between adversaries increases the likelihood of peaceful resolution, but decreases that of militarized disputes.

Scientific knowledge is always a work in progress. What is “known” today may be overturned tomorrow (Vasquez 2000:335).

Democracy, territory, and conflict are central concepts within the study of international politics. Both during and after the Cold War, many students of international conflict have focused on how regime type and state behavior might be connected to each other, most prominently in relation to the democratic peace proposition. Although this research does consider issues in investigating democracies in conflict, few studies pay close attention to how democracies settle their differences when a contentious matter is at stake. Thus, disaggregating cases according to the characteristics of their issues may add to the overall understanding of conflict management and the specifics of the causal relationship between

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democracy and peace. The purpose of this study is to test the democratic peace by investigating peaceful or conflictual management efforts by democratic dyads for territorial claims.

Based on Hensel’s (2001) issue correlates of war (ICOW) data from 1816 to 1992, we report findings that create an interesting puzzle for the democratic or neo-Kantian peace: when it comes to interstate territorial disputes, issue-related variables come to the fore and matter more than regime type in explaining outcomes. The most important finding is that war experience between adversaries increases the likelihood of peaceful settlement attempts, but decreases that of militarized settlement attempts.

Democracy, Conflict Management, and Territorial Claims

This study seeks to contribute to the understanding of conflict processes by comparing the peaceful or conflictual impact of democracy vis-à-vis the settlement of territorial issues. The central question is, how do democratic dyads behave in interstate conflicts that concern highly contentious issues—specifically, territory? It has been argued that two democratic states in a dyad should reveal a positive (negative) connection with peaceful (militarized) attempts at settlement. Various empirical studies have supported the connection (e.g., Mousseau 1998; Russett and Starr 2000; Russett and Oneal 2001; Bueno de Mesquita et al. 2003). Students of the democratic peace base their theoretical reasoning on political structures and norms in democratic societies.

According to the logic of the structural explanation (e.g., Bueno de Mesquita and Lalman 1992; Maoz and Russett 1993; Ray 1995; Siverson 1995; Gelpi and Griesdorf 2001), government structures in a democracy slow down the process of decision making and impose costs on democratic leaders who choose the use of force in international disputes. Democratic leaders should bear more political accountability for their foreign policy choices because of a desire to be reelected, relative easiness of removing incumbents through regular elections, and a wide

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1. Issue claims in ICOW are identified on the basis of official, explicit statements by the government of at least one state regarding ownership of a piece of territory that is claimed or administered by another state. Purely secessionist conflicts and claims to fishing or maritime zones (unless they entail island territory) are excluded (Hensel 2001:90). Further information on the ICOW project (Paul R. Hensel, Director and Sara McLaughlin Mitchell, Assistant Director) can be obtained at http://garnet.acns.fsu.edu/~phensel/icow.html.

2. Territory is one of the most fundamental causes of international conflict (Kocs 1995; Vasquez 1995, 2004; Huth 1996a, 1996b, 2000; Gibler and Vasquez 1998; Gibler 1999; Hensel 1999, 2000; Senese 1999; Simmons 1999; Vasquez and Henehan 2001; Gleditsch 2002; Senese and Vasquez 2003). Territorial disputes are found to escalate to war “more than three times (0.013–0.004) more frequently than nonterritorial ones” (Senese 1999:169; see also Hensel 1999:131). According to Hensel’s (2000) investigation of two prominent conflict data sets from 1816 to 1992, about 30% of Militarized Interstate Disputes and 55% of interstate wars involve explicit contention over territorial issues. Furthermore, when looking at the full history of an interstate dyad, a record dominated by territorial rather than policy disputes is significantly more likely to produce a war between its members (Vasquez 2004:13). Other findings about territory and conflict processes are consistent with the results summarized so far, and alliances also are a factor in this discussion in an interesting way. Territorial settlement treaties have an important pacifying effect; their participants experience far fewer wars in subsequent years than otherwise would be expected (Gibler 1999:196; see also Gibler and Vasquez 1998). The implication is that removing territory from the agenda of issues between two or more states represents a significant step away from escalating to war.

It should be noted that few studies, so far, have focused mainly on territorial issues until quite recently (Vasquez 1993), probably because of the longstanding dominance of realist scholarship, which focused on capability-based factors in attempting to explain international conflict processes (James 2002). Petersen, Vasquez and Wang (2004; see also Hensel 1999:128–129) establish that the reason is not a decline in territorial wars, as claimed by Holsti (1991) in a frequently cited study that does not use standard definitions. Based on conventional Correlates of War (COW) criteria, territorial wars have been fairly stable in occurrence since 1870 (except for World War II and its immediate aftermath) and generally have been the most frequent type of war in a given period (Petersen, Vasquez and Wang, 2004).

3. Given the purpose of this study, it is not necessary to survey all of the theoretical mechanisms put forward concerning operation of the democratic peace. We focus on political structures and norms for theoretical linkages directly related to the main question of territorial claims.
range of constituencies such as the legislature, opposition parties, interest groups, and the public. When adversaries are democratic, structural constraints will be reinforced because democratic leaders are more deliberate than autocrats in their decision to use force. When a conflicting interest arises between two democracies, the relatively plodding structural features allow them to find peaceful solutions before enough domestic support builds up in either state for the use of armed force. In addition, political opponents may do their best to mobilize opinion against incumbent leaders’ attempts to use force against other democracies.

The normative explanation focuses on norm externalization and mutual trust between democracies (e.g., Dixon 1993, 1994; Maoz and Russett 1993; Russett 1993; Weart 1998; Simmons 1999; Mitchell 2002). Peaceful settlements are regarded as more likely between democracies than other conflicting pairs because of their experience with mediation, negotiation, and compromise at the domestic level (Dixon 1993, 1994). These experiences socialize democratic leaders to act on the basis of norms of peaceful conflict resolution whenever possible with, for example, a greater emphasis on the rule of law (Simmons 1999). When two democracies are involved in a dispute with one another, they externalize their domestic political norms because of a conviction that the other state also persists in such norms. Put differently, this conviction makes democracies more likely to trust and respect each other when conflicting interests arise between them, regardless of the issues at hand. Recent research above the level of the dyad offers support to the idea of neighborhood (Gleditsch 2002) or even system-level effects (Mitchell 2002), in which democratic norms become more pervasive as the fraction of democracies in the system increases, to the point where even the behavior of nondemocracies begins to change in a more desirable direction (Mitchell, Kadera, and Crescenzi 2004).

In short, students of the democratic peace argue that, due to normative and structural constraints, democratic dyads are more likely to peacefully settle their militarized disputes that include threats to use military force, displays of military force, or actual uses of force (Gochman and Maoz 1984).

It should be noted that students of the democratic peace have not as yet drawn close attention to how two democratic states in a dyad settle especially contentious issues, such as territory. Rather, they combine territorial issues within militarized disputes without paying attention to how the nonmilitary prior contests over such issues escalate to militarization. Doing so assumes that members of democratic dyads may be unwilling to use force against each other over territorial issues. Mitchell and Prins (1999), for example, reveal that territorial MIDs between well-established democracies (defined as having a score of 10 from Polity) are rare in comparison with those between other states. Given Petersen, Vasquez, and Wang’s (2004) observation that territorial wars have been fairly stable in occurrence since 1870, Mitchell and Prins’ findings certainly give credence to the democratic peace argument. However, it is also doubtful that many well-established democracies have shared borders throughout history.

It is interesting that, according to Bueno de Mesquita et al.’s (2003:418–432) analysis of the size of the winning coalition in a state and its war aims, the smaller the winning coalition, the more likely it becomes that war aims will focus on private goods such as territory rather than public goods such as policy disputes. Here, the winning coalition refers to the size of the subset among those selecting a leader that is sufficient to keep that person in power. The proposition yields a prediction of peaceful settlement by democracies and their unwillingness to use force in territorial disputes. This provides another point in favor of the structural explanation for the democratic peace because the size of the winning coalition is an obvious correlate of democratic governance.

It also can be argued that if the public in democratic societies becomes particularly attached to a piece of territory and constrains political leaders, public opinion
may propel governments toward bellicosity to recover or protect it. In this case, it
appears that structural constraints in democratic societies may be attenuated. It also
should be noted that although military force in support of territorial claims is likely
to create “short-term domestic support, costly or failed attempts at military coer-
cision will also mobilize domestic opposition” (Huth and Allee 2002:71). In this sense,
democratic dyads should, in the long run, pursue more peaceful settlement at-
ttempts or not engage in militarized settlement attempts even for territorial issues.
Hensel’s (2001) work examines how contentious issues, such as territory, affect
cooperation and conflict among states. More specifically, Hensel investigates how
issue-related variables, like issue salience and past issue interactions, influence
democratic adversaries’ strategies to manage and even settle territorial conflicts.
Hensel finds (1) that not all issues will shape world politics with equal importance;
(2) that issues of different salience may result in variegated outcomes; and (3) that
territory is identified as one of the most conflictual issues. In the same vein, Mitchell
and Prins’ (1999) report that democracies are able, among themselves, to eliminate
the single most contentious issue in international politics, which, in turn, dampens
disputes. Therefore, ceteris paribus, our hypothesis on democratic dyads is as follows:

**Hypothesis 1:** Democratic dyads are more likely than other combinations of states to engage
in peaceful attempts and less likely to engage in militarized attempts when settling territorial
claims.

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Evaluating Democratic Dyads to Build on the Issue-Based Approach

For empirical testing, we choose to utilize Hensel’s (2001:81) issue-based approach
that “depicts world politics as the quest for issue satisfaction by actors using nu-
merous peaceful and militarized means.” With the ICOW data set from 1816 to
1992, Hensel was able to examine militarized as well as nonmilitarized claims,
which reduces the bias that might arise from studying settlement attempts to re-
solve territorial claims that have reached the level of militarized conflict alone. Put
differently, as Hensel’s data set does not select claims based on the level of mili-
tarization, around 40–50% of the territorial claims in ICOW experience no Mil-
tarized Interstate Disputes (MIDs), which allows us to study peaceful versus
militarized means of settlement more effectively. Thus, Hensel’s data is suitable for
testing a hypothesis that focuses on democratic dyads and territorial issues in light
of both peaceful and militarized conflict management.

In effect, this strategy of research design is a significant improvement on the
conventional statistical research designs that focus on the democratic peace. Many
quantitative studies of the democratic peace examine whether two democracies
tend to engage in MIDs less frequently than other types of countries based upon
the set of dyads including those who never had fought or had a chance to fight each
other (e.g., Switzerland and South Korea). With a research design of that kind, we
cannot be sure of whether the separate peace between democracies is because of
greater geographic distance between them or the structural and normative con-
straints democracies uniquely experience; it then becomes especially interesting to
observe that current explanations of the democratic peace require the assumption
that disputes arise between democracies (Gartzke 1998). More importantly, this
approach to research design fails to account for the procedural nature of an inter-

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4 The issue-based approach is well established; its evolution may be traced through Rosenau (1967), O’Leary
Hensel (2001), and Mitchell (2002). A lack of data is the primary reason why empirical examination of particular
issues at stake in international disputes became prominent in the conflict literature only in recent years (Mitchell and
Prins 1999; Hensel 2001; see also Vasquez 1993:chapter 4).
state dispute, which usually starts with disagreement over some issue or issues, goes through settlement attempts by resorting to peaceful means or armed force, and escalates to further militarization. Some studies regarding democracy and conflict management do consider the process of interstate conflict by investigating conflict behaviors of pairs of democracies already involved in some military hostility such as MIDs. These studies produce important and useful findings regarding the escalation of militarized disputes to higher levels of conflict such as war; however, they test hypotheses about interstate disputes and democracy without fully considering the unfolding and development of interstate disputes between states and without sufficient attention to issues of case selection (Huth and Allee 2002). In other words, while the findings from these studies may offer support to the idea that democracies do not fight wars with each other, they do not necessarily explain the rarity of lower-level militarized disputes between democracies, another widely accepted empirical regularity.

Through use of ICOW data, which takes one step back and looks at the type of claim—"territorial claim" here in this study—that precedes militarization, we are able to test whether democracies can prevent militarization of their disputes in the first place. Given our interest in testing the logic of the dyadic democratic peace proposition, the existence of a source of dispute, a "territorial disagreement," becomes a natural place to begin the analysis because the structural and normative explanations center on the ability of two democracies to manage conflicts of interest peacefully and prevent militarization (see Huth and Allee 2002).

One further point concerns potential selection effects. The data set includes the Dem-Auto measure of 255 (5.46%) and the Dem measure of 414 (8.87%) democratic dyad-years within a total of 4,668; these measures are discussed below in this section. The percentages are similar to those from the standard Polity III data set; we find only 7.61% and 9.11% of all dyad-years to be democratic for the same period. Thus, we are certain that democratic dyads in our data set do not engage in fewer territorial claims and/or do not present existing territorial claims in a non-militarized manner. In addition, the scarcity of democracies in the Western Hemisphere does not pose a significant problem; as Rosato (2003:600) observes, "90% of purely democratic dyads have been confined to two geographic regions, the Americas and Western Europe" (emphasis added).

Based on Hensel's (2001:101) pioneering work, we later build logit models for peaceful and militarized attempts and include eight control variables to test the democratic dyad hypothesis. It should be noted that, because a given claim may give rise to multiple settlement attempts in a given year, multinomial logit models are not appropriate. There are 138 claim-years in the data set, or one-fifth of all years with at least one settlement attempt. In other words, models for both peaceful and militarized attempts are needed to avoid losing information by using a questionable selection rule.

Our first dependent variable utilizes Hensel's peaceful settlement attempts, which are subdivided and tested separately as bilateral negotiation, nonbinding third party, and binding third party in his models. As a modification of Hensel (2001), we treat all three attempts as a single category of peaceful attempts. In doing so, we can assess the relationship between democratic dyads, issues, and peaceful conflict management in the most direct, comprehensive way. Put differ-

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5 In response to common criticisms against territorial data with respect to selection bias, Senese and Vasquez (2003) conduct one of the most stringent tests of a territorial explanation of conflict and war. Comparing Huth's (1996a) data on territorial claims with MID data during the period from 1919 to 1992, Senese and Vasquez (2003:294) report that "we do not find any evidence that sample bias affects the results on territorial claims or MIDs." Although Senese and Vasquez do not focus directly on the ICOW data used in this study, we do not expect that Hensel's (2001) territorial claims data would produce significantly different results.

6 We argue that, while valuable in moving forward the study of issues, Hensel's disaggregated models are less appropriate for testing the most fundamental argument of the democratic peace—"democracy encourages peace."
ently, since democracies should, according to the democratic peace, pursue any possible peaceful solutions, differences between bilateral negotiation from third-party approaches are less pronounced in our model.\(^7\) The variable is dichotomous. If a peaceful attempt at resolution of territorial conflict occurs between democratic adversaries in a dyad-year, regardless of its type (e.g., bilateral negotiation, non-binding third-party, or binding third-party assistance), such an occurrence is coded as 1. Otherwise the coding is 0.

Our second dependent variable relies on Hensel’s (2001:96) dichotomous militarized settlement attempts that “involve territorial issues when at least one of the dispute participants is coded as seeking a territorial revision in the status quo.” The ICOW territorial data set identifies militarized attempts to settle territorial claims using the COW Project’s MID data set (Jones, Bremer, and Singer 1996), which includes an issue code for “territorial issues,” along with “regime” issues and a general category for “policy” issues.\(^8\) Therefore, by definition, our militarized attempts are a subset of the standard MID involvement, the dependent variable perhaps most often used in the democratic peace and neo-Kantian peace literature.

Two different measures are created for the democratic dyads hypothesis. Both are dichotomous. One is operationalized by subtracting the Polity III index (Jaggers and Gurr 1995) of a state’s authoritarian characteristics (i.e., 0 to 10) from its institutionalized democratic characteristics (i.e., 0 to 10); we then code 1 if both states in a dyad have 6 or higher as a democratic and authoritarian score, otherwise 0 (Dem-Auto measure hereafter). Another dichotomous measure considers only the democratic characteristics; much of the democratic peace literature on conflict management also uses this option (see Dixon, 1993, 1994). We code 1 if both states in a dyad have 6 or higher as a democracy score, otherwise 0 (Dem measure hereafter).\(^9\)

Hensel (2001) examines the peace-inducing effect of democracy by treating it as a control variable. With the Polity 98 data set, Hensel employs the weak link assumption (see Dixon 1993, 1994) for the democracy control by choosing “the lower democracy score from the two states in the dyad” (p. 97). But the weak link assumption does not necessarily capture what we have hypothesized, namely, the positive effect of a democratic dyad on peace. Our democratic dyads hypothesis requires that the level of each state’s democracy in a dyad year be six or higher, meaning that only mature democracies are chosen. If we choose the lower of the two scores within the dyad, we can measure only the effects of the less constrained state within the dyad. Put differently, while the weak link assumes that outcome is

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\(^7\) Some studies produce certain expectations about third-party conflict management. For example, Mitchell’s (2002:755) project on third-party conflict resolution in the Americas finds that (a) efforts to settle territorial claims are related positively to the proportion of democracies in the international system and (b) an interaction term, namely proportion of democracies × nondemocratic dyad, also is linked positively to attempts to settle territorial claims (i.e., as the percentage of democracies increases in the system, democratic norms toward conflict management and resolution begin to spread through the remaining nondemocratic states). This study lends especially valuable system-level insights into the problem at hand.

\(^8\) As a point of clarification, a territorial claim may be the trigger for a militarized attempt at resolution, that is, a militarized interstate dispute. In other words, the claim is neither “within” nor a by-product of a dispute, as these terms are used here.

\(^9\) The data set contains a total of 113 claims representing 74 distinct pieces of territory in the Western Hemisphere. At some point of their claim period, 19 from Dem-Auto measure and 26 Dem different dyads have qualified as democratic dyads. This creates a total of 255 and 414 dyad years, respectively, in 4,668 dyadic years for the logit analysis. Given the naturally greater interest that will exist about interdemocratic dyads with a territorial conflict, a list appears in Appendix A.
conditioned on a particular member of the dyad, our measures focus on both members' levels of democracy. We argue that the two dichotomous democratic measures (i.e., Dem-Auto and Dem) that capture the pacifying effects of democratic dyads are more appropriate for our analysis than the weak link.

Based on Hensel's (2001) work, let us briefly introduce eight control variables that may influence states' decisions about settlement attempts when territorial claims are present. First, the presence of the same treaties or institutions accepted by both states in a dyad may create demand for peaceful settlement of disputes (Shared Institutions hereafter). This variable is similar to joint membership in international organizations in the democratic peace program of research (see Russett and Oneal 2001). It is measured as “a count of multilateral treaties and institutions calling for the peaceful settlement of disputes that both states have signed and ratified” (Hensel 2001:97).

Second, although territorial issues are expected to affect states' interactions significantly, great variation exists in salience across individual territorial claims. In particular, when the specific issue under contention is very salient, policy makers are more likely to do something to find a promising position. In such a situation, doing nothing may make leaders appear incapable of conducting foreign policy, thereby opening the window for domestic political competitors. Put differently, high issue salience will influence states significantly to make attempts, both peaceful and military, at settling their territorial claims (Issue Salience hereafter, see Hensel 2001:85–86). Issue Salience is based on six salience indicators, which in turn correspond to dummy variables. Four of six indicators involve characteristics of the claimed territory: “the presence of sizable towns or cities,” “the (confirmed or believed) existence of valuable resources,” the strategic economic or military value of the territory’s location, and “explicit statements by the challenger state noting an ethnic or religious basis for its claim” (Hensel 2001). Two others focus on the type of territory under contention: “explicit statements by each state indicating that the territory is considered to be part of the national homeland rather than colony or other dependency, and location of the claimed territory on the national mainland rather than offshore” (Hensel 2001). The range of the resulting salience index is from 0 to 12, with “each indicator equally weighted (0–2)” (Hensel 2001:94–95).

Third, because of pessimistic memories about unfruitful outcomes, past unsuccessful interactions between adversaries are more likely to lead to militarized disputes (Past Unsuccessful Attempts hereafter). By contrast, past successful interactions should have a positive effect on conflict management (Past Successful Attempts hereafter). Past Unsuccessful and Successful Attempts are measured, respectively, by the number of unsuccessful settlement attempts and the number of successful settlement attempts in the preceding 15 years (Hensel 2001:86–87, 96).

Fourth, a recent history of militarized conflict between two states may lead to militarized action or a decrease in efforts toward peaceful settlement (Recent MIDs hereafter). The level of Recent MIDs is measured by the number of militarized interstate disputes in a dyad over the preceding 15 years. However, due to a “war-weariness” effect that includes recent horrible memories of full-scale war, recent war experience should deter states from pursuing militarized measures over peaceful efforts toward settlement (Recent War Involvement hereafter). Using the MID data set, Recent War Involvement is operationalized dichotomously by whether or not the claimants have been involved in a full-scale interstate war with each other within the prior 15 years (Hensel 2001:88–89, 96).

Fifth, previous research shows that the greater the difference in capabilities between two states, the lower the likelihood that they will be involved in a militarized dispute (Kugler and Lemke 1996; Mitchell 2002). Therefore, we include the cap-

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10 We do not offer detailed explanations of the control variables, which are easily accessible in Hensel (2001).
ability ratio for each dyad (Capabilities Ratio hereafter). Based on the COW Composite Indicators of National Capabilities (CINC) data (Singer, Bremer, and Stuckey 1972), the measurement for relative power in a given dyad is a natural logarithm of the higher/lower ratio between states A and B. Eugene software is used for the operationalization (see Bennett and Stam 2000).

Sixth, while Time-Since-Last-Attempt measures years since the last peaceful attempts, Peace Years measure peaceful years since the last military attempts. These two controls should alleviate possible violations related to error terms in each equation.

We lag all independent variables, except for the issue-related variable, by 1 year to avert the possibility that dependent variables in any given year influence the values taken by an annual observation of an independent variable.¹¹ In addition, as the data set is structured in the form of a cross-sectional time series, there may be time dependence among dyads across years. Thus, we use the logit cubic spline method developed by Beck, Katz, and Tucker (1998) to test and solve for temporal dependence.

Empirical Results: How Do Democratic Dyads Deal with Territorial Claims?¹²

Multivariate logit data analysis based on Beck, Katz, and Tucker’s (1998) spline method will unfold in two stages.¹³ The first stage presents the empirical results with a focus on the impact of democratic dyads on peaceful attempts. The second stage deals with democratic dyads and militarized attempts. Discussion of findings will center on Hypothesis 1 and the other variables.

Model 1 from Table 1 tests for the pacific nature of dyadic democracy in conflict management (Hypothesis 1). This proposition corresponds perhaps most directly to the main theme of the present study. Through modification of Hensel’s dependent variables mentioned earlier, we assess the peace-inducing effect of democracy. As shown in the second column of the table, the Dem-Auto measure for democratic dyads is positive for peaceful attempts and statistically significant at the .10 level, suggesting that democratic territorial adversaries are more likely to engage in such efforts with each other than other types. This result is consistent with the democratic peace conflict management literature and its proposition that democracies are more likely to resolve conflicts peacefully with each other. We test this proposition again in Model 2 with the Dem measure of democratic dyads. The results from Model 2 in the fourth column are rather nuanced. Although the sign is positive, this measure does not produce statistical significance. The varying results may indicate that when democratic states still have some autocratic characteristics, nondemocratic factors may weaken this disposition toward compromise and peaceful negotiation.

Models 3 and 4 in Table 2 test the conflict-inhibiting effect of dyadic democracy, the most widely supported connection in empirical studies of the democratic peace (e.g., Russett and Oneal 2001). The result is surprising: neither the Dem-Auto measure for democratic dyads in the second column nor the Dem measure in the fourth column appears to have statistically significant effects on militarized conflict. In sum, both the peace-inducing and conflict-inhibiting effects of democratic dyads are too inconclusive to confirm Hypothesis 1. One measure, Dem-Auto, found sup-

¹¹We do not lag issue-related variables because issue salience, for example, does not vary within each panel of dyads but across individual claims in our data set (see Hensel 2001).

¹²Spearman’s ρ reports a correlation of 0.046 between Peaceful Attempts and Dem-Auto with p-value < .002 and .024 between Peaceful Attempts and Dem with p-value < .107; .014 between Militarized Attempts and Dem-Auto with p-value < .329 and .005 between Militarized Attempts and Dem with p-value < .857.

¹³To assess robustness, we also use generalized estimating equations (GEE) (see Russett and Oneal 2001; Zorn 2001). The results are very similar to those from Beck et al.’s reported in Tables 1 and 2. One difference from the GEE models is that the two measures for Democratic Dyads never obtain statistical significance.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variables</th>
<th>Model 1</th>
<th>Model 2</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Dem-Auto</td>
<td>Dem</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
| Constant                   | −2.308*** (0.303)
                          | −0.833*** (0.131) | −2.288*** (0.304) | −0.821*** (0.130) |
| Democratic dyads           | 0.377* (0.251)   | 0.362* (0.254)   | 0.215 (0.186)     | 0.185 (0.209)     |
| Shared institutions        | 0.011 (0.021)    | 0.009 (0.020)    | 0.015 (0.021)     | 0.012 (0.020)     |
| Issue salience             | 0.118*** (0.032) |                  |                  |                  |
| Past unsuccessful attempts | 0.097*** (0.027) |                  |                  |                  |
| Past successful attempts   | −0.026 (0.036)   |                  | −0.033 (0.038)    |                  |
| Recent MIDs                | 0.077*** (0.031) |                  | 0.073*** (0.031)  |                  |
| Recent war involvement     | 0.394*** (0.213) |                  | 0.398*** (0.215)  |                  |
| Capabilities ratio         | −0.056* (0.040)  | −0.145** (0.049) | −0.061* (0.041)   | −0.145*** (0.049) |
| Time since last attempt    | −0.163*** (0.061) | −0.251*** (0.058) | −0.165*** (0.061) | −0.253*** (0.058) |
| Chi-square                 | 442.89           | 200.82           | 431.68            | 196.26            |
| P of chi-square            | < .0001          | < .0001          | < .0001           | < .0001           |
| Log Likelihood             | −1493.9619       | −1532.5826       | −1494.9021        | −1533.7095        |
| N                          | 4668             | 4668             | 4668              | 4668              |

Note: *p < .10, **p < .05, ***p < .01, one-tailed tests; the spline coefficients are not reported.

1 Robust standard errors are in parentheses.
<table>
<thead>
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<th>Variables</th>
<th>Model 3</th>
<th>Model 4</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Dem-Auto</td>
<td>Dem</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>-2.411** (0.506)**</td>
<td>-1.006** (0.198)</td>
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<td>-0.042 (0.276)</td>
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<td>0.052* (0.028)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Issue salience</td>
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<td>0.073* (0.051)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Past unsuccessful attempts</td>
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<tr>
<td>Past successful attempts</td>
<td>0.080** (0.036)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Recent MDs</td>
<td>0.120*** (0.034)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Recent war involvement</td>
<td>-0.950*** (0.277)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Capabilities ratio</td>
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<td>P of chi square</td>
<td>&lt;.0001</td>
<td>&lt;.0001</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Log likelihood</td>
<td>-635.2586</td>
<td>-655.5829</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N</td>
<td>4668</td>
<td>4668</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: *p<.10, **p<.05, ***p<.01, one-tailed tests; the spline coefficients are not reported.

Shown in parentheses are robust standard errors.

Table 2. Spline Logit Regressions: Accounting for Militarized Attempts
port only in Model 1. The “bottom line” with respect to specification appears to be this: when the importance of territorial issues is considered, the dyadic democratic peace effect does not exert the same level of influence over conflict management.

It would be interesting to see if the democratic dyads variables become statistically significant with some of the issue-related variables dropped from the models. Columns 3 and 5 in each table show the results for these altered models. The effects of democratic dyads in columns 3 and 5 in each table are the same as those in columns 2 and 4. Overall, as far as territorial claims go, the democratic peace faces a puzzle worthy of further consideration.

Tables 1 and 2 also report results for the effect of Shared Institutions on Peaceful and militarized attempts. As noted earlier, this variable is similar to joint membership in international organizations in the Kantian peace literature (see Russett and Oneal 2001). Shown in the second and fourth columns of Table 1, the coefficient for Shared Institutions is positive, but not statistically significant for peaceful attempts in either Model 1 or 2. Surprisingly, Shared Institutions produce counterintuitive results in the second and fourth columns of Table 2. They are related positively to militarized attempts, with $p < .10$ and $p < .05$, respectively, in Models 3 and 4.

Two interpretations for these results are possible. First, international organizations’ influence on peace is reduced when the issues at stake are contentious, as is, most notably, territory. Second, as Gallarotti (2001) points out, international organizations can be used to promote or magnify conflict between adversaries. One way or the other, the results indicate that institutional constraints are far from a “guarantee of success” with respect to pacific conflict management and resolution (see also Hensel 2001:105).

As shown in the second and fourth columns, Issue Salience, the past issue interaction variables, and Recent MIDs are statistically significant in Models 1 and 2 of Table 1, with the exception of Past Successful Attempts. Issue Salience, Past Unsuccessful Attempts, and Recent MIDs are related positively to peaceful settlement attempts. Yet we must be careful about interpretation of these results. Do these variables really encourage peaceful attempts? This inference is problematic because the variables also are statistically significant in the second and fourth columns in Models 3 and 4 of Table 2 for militarized attempts. Rather, it can be better stated that salience of issues and past active settling activities prompt future actions and attempts, whether they are peaceful or militarized.

Recent War Involvement is a variable especially worth noting: it has a positive effect on peaceful attempts at the .05 level in Table 1 and a negative effect on militarized attempts at the .01 level in Table 2. These results suggest that disputants who experienced full-scale war with each other in the preceding 15 years may be reluctant to resort to military means for management of territorial claims because such efforts can invoke another disastrous outcome, such as war itself. Thus, the logic of “war-weariness” is supported: “war may induce a general revulsion against war and an immunity against subsequent military action until the memory of war fades, . . . ” (Levy and Morgan 1986:27).

As shown in the second and fourth columns of Tables 1 and 2, the effects of the Capabilities Ratio appear inconclusive. A higher Capabilities Ratio seems to decrease peaceful attempts as well as militarized attempts.14

Conclusions

Studies of territory in international relations confirm that it is one of the most contentious issues in world politics. Meanwhile, democracies are said to be relatively

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14 Three standard multicollinearity tests, the $R^2$ statistic, the Variance Inflation Factor and the Condition Index, fail to detect multicollinearity (see Belsley, Kuh, and Welsh 1980; Gujarati 1995; Menard 2002). Following Achen (2002), we also limited each regression to a smaller number of independent variables to check the robustness of our findings and found only minor differences in the results.
satisfied with the territorial status quo because the nature of democracy is peaceful and oriented toward gradual, negotiated change. Thus, it can be argued that democratic states have been less likely to be involved in territorial claims and possess the ability to remove territorial issues from the agenda. We have explored the broad theoretical relationships between and among regime type, territorial issues, and conflict management.

This study’s results produce three main conclusions that introduce some new aspects into the study of territory and interstate conflict: (1) domestic–cultural and institutional constraints experienced by democratic dyads involved in territorial claims appear to have little or no systematic effect on their choice among strategies to resolve those claims; (2) factors that affect conflict management most significantly are not limited to regime type but instead may concern the salience of issues in dispute and states’ past experience over the same contentious issues; and (3) among the issue-related factors included in this study, only painful memories about past war make democratic dyads both more reluctant to use militarized means and amenable to peaceful settlement.

Based on this study’s findings, it can be said that issues really make a difference in world politics—perhaps on par with form of government. Although many states became democracies after the end of the Cold War, can conflict between human groups be expected to disappear or even diminish around the globe? Surely not—they will continue to quarrel with one another over numerous contentious issues, most notably, territory. Thus, the epigraph from Vasquez (2000) seems to ring true: scientific knowledge added from the present study expands the collection of factors that must be incorporated in a compelling explanation for conflict management with respect to territorial issue claims. Further issue-oriented studies help us to find clues about the vast and complex characteristics and causes of conflict. Contentious issues such as oil, environmental problems, ethnic and religious conflicts, open seas, open skies (related to placement of artificial satellites), fresh water, the North–South debate, and others are sufficient to span the world and will continue to produce interstate disputes.

This study naturally concludes with a discussion of important policy implications. Democratization may not be the best policy for the United States as the world leader (or quasi-hegemonic power) to prevent international violence and encourage peace. Instead, U.S. policy makers need to redirect their concern from support for democratization toward a more direct and proactive focus on management and resolution of contentious issues. Current world events provide the rationale for this policy implication. For example, two democratic states, Pakistan and India, appear to be playing old-fashioned brinkmanship, and at least one antagonist so far shows willingness to inflict terrorist attacks on the other. These states share democratic norms and institutions, at least to some degree, but violence continues—in a setting that involves nuclear weapons. Israel, to cite another instance, is experiencing waves of severe internal conflict with the Palestinian Authority (PA). The violence of Pakistan–India and that of Israel-PA does not seem related essentially to differences in regime type. Rather, fighting continues over very contentious issues such as ethnicity, religion, and territory.
Appendix A: A List of Democratic Dyads

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Claimed territory</th>
<th>State A</th>
<th>State B</th>
<th>Dem-Auto</th>
<th>Dem</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>St. Croix-St. John rivers</td>
<td>U.S.A.</td>
<td>U.K.</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Oregon country</td>
<td>U.S.A.</td>
<td>U.K.</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Haro channel</td>
<td>U.S.A.</td>
<td>U.K.</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Alaska</td>
<td>U.K.</td>
<td>U.S.A.</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Labrador</td>
<td>Canada</td>
<td>U.K.</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cuba</td>
<td>U.S.A.</td>
<td>Spain</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Navassa island</td>
<td>Haiti</td>
<td>U.S.A.</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Virgin islands</td>
<td>USA</td>
<td>Denmark</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Quito Sue</td>
<td>Colombia</td>
<td>U.S.A.</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Quito Sue</td>
<td>Nicaragua</td>
<td>Colombia</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Quito Sue</td>
<td>Honduras</td>
<td>U.S.A.</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>San Andres</td>
<td>Nicaragua</td>
<td>Colombia</td>
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<tr>
<td>Belize</td>
<td>Guatemala</td>
<td>U.K.</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
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<tr>
<td>Bolsones</td>
<td>El Salvador</td>
<td>Honduras</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gulf of Fonseca Islands</td>
<td>Honduras</td>
<td>El Salvador</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Swan Islands</td>
<td>Honduras</td>
<td>U.S.A.</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
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<td>Serran</td>
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<td>Los Monjes</td>
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<td>Venezuela</td>
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<tr>
<td>Essequibo</td>
<td>Venezuela</td>
<td>U.K.</td>
<td>1</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Corentyn/New River Triangle</td>
<td>Netherlands</td>
<td>U.K.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Maroni</td>
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<td>France</td>
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<tr>
<td>Cordillera del C</td>
<td>Ecuador</td>
<td>Peru</td>
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<td>Yaguar</td>
<td>Uruguay</td>
<td>Brazil</td>
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<tr>
<td>Antofagasta</td>
<td>Bolivia</td>
<td>Chile</td>
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<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Palena/Continental Glaciers</td>
<td>Chile</td>
<td>Argentina</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Falkland (Malvinas) Islands</td>
<td>Argentina</td>
<td>U.K.</td>
<td>1</td>
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</table>

References


