

What determines US humanitarian intervention?

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Abstract

Why does the United States as a third party intervene abroad in responding to humanitarian crises? While liberals argue that the purpose of an intervention is to protect victims of human rights violations, realists contend that interventions have little relation to humanitarian concerns and aim, instead, at certain national interests such as securing an oil supply. Making scientific progress, in explaining the determinants of US humanitarian intervention, requires confronting these theoretical positions with data. Drawing on a cross-national, time-series data analysis of 153 countries for the years 1981–2005, the quantitative research presented in this study is the first of its kind to evaluate the relative importance of these competing theoretical perspectives. After controlling for other variables such as democracy and media coverage, this study finds evidence that the United States is likely to use force in a manner consistent with the theory put forth by liberals. This finding indicates that US humanitarian interventions are utilized for the purpose of preserving liberal norms and moral values rather than for pursuing national interests.

Keywords

Humanitarian intervention, human rights violations, liberalism, realism

Introduction

Since the consequences of international conflict can be devastating and destructive, scholars and policy-makers are eager to learn how to manage a conflict (e.g. Bercovitch and Regan, 2004). Although there are multiple approaches to conflict management, third party intervention is often regarded as an effective means to limit the spread of a conflict and minimize suffering. This study looks into US military intervention in responding to humanitarian crises and addresses the question of why US military forces are deployed abroad in the first place. In doing so, this study approaches conflict management differently since its main focus is on the factors determining the choice of US military action rather than the success or failure of conflict resolution. Specifically, this study explores the motivation for humanitarian intervention from two contrasting perspectives of

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international relations that have long offered guidance for academic and policy circles in the United States, realism and liberalism.

For example, in the op-ed, “Why We Shouldn’t Attack Syria (Yet)”, in the *New York Times*, political scientist Robert A. Pape (2012) argued that “a mass-homicide campaign is under way there, but a means to stop it without unacceptable loss of life is not yet available”. On the other hand, Senator John McCain, a leader among Senate Republicans on military matters, called for immediate US-led airstrikes against Syria’s armed forces to stop the slaughter and save innocent civilian lives there, much as it did in Libya in 2011 (Cushman, 2012). Not surprisingly, Pape (2012) anticipated some disagreement with his op-ed and noted, in advance, that “as the world’s sole military superpower, the United States will be at the center of many future debates over humanitarian action”. Indeed, many academic scholars and policy-makers disagree on what type of leadership role the United States should assume in response to humanitarian crises.

Realists often express skepticism about the motives of the United States by asserting that nation-states are rarely willing to sacrifice their own soldiers in overseas interventions purely for humanitarian reasons (e.g. Morgenthau, 1967). From this point of view, US humanitarian interventions are simply another foreign policy tool used for pursuing national interests, such as securing the supply of oil or extending power interests (Fordham, 2008). This skeptical perspective is at odds with the liberal argument that humanitarian interventions are a manifestation of America’s moral obligations and responsibilities as a world leader (Lischer, 2005; Murdie and Davis, 2010; Pearson et al., 1994). This controversy is often based on a few anecdotal observations rather than systematic evidence, so academic and policy circles are still in need of empirical evidence that can serve as a benchmark for future debates.

When a few researchers looked for empirical evidence, they focused mostly on outside interventions in civil conflicts. For example, when Regan (2000) examined the conditions under which third parties will intervene in civil conflicts, he found that humanitarian crises are more likely to induce foreign interventions. In spite of Regan’s efforts, his research lumped together all such third party interventions so that it overlooked the root causes of military interventions specifically initiated by the United States, which has been one of the countries most often involved in such interventions. In an analysis of Third World internal wars for the years 1945–1989, Yoon (1997) compares strategic and economic interests as well as domestic factors related to US foreign policy but leaves out humanitarian factors. When Meernik (1996) addresses the question of whether US military interventions have led to increased levels of democracy, he treats US foreign policy behavior as a predictor, not as an outcome variable; consequently, his quantitative research fails to acknowledge which factors determine US military interventions.

Utilizing widely used datasets on military intervention and human rights (Cingranelli and Richards, 2010; Kisangani and Pickering, 2008; Pearson and Baumann, 1993a, b; Pickering and Kisangani, 2009; Wood and Gibney, 2010), the empirical research presented in this study is the first attempt to address the issue of what motives lie behind US humanitarian military intervention. The findings of this study have important foreign policy implications for future decisions concerning humanitarian interventions. If the findings turn out to be consistent with the claims of skeptics concerning the ulterior motives of US humanitarian intervention, then the use of military force in the name of humanitarianism would hardly be justifiable in the eyes of the American public in any future interventions. Furthermore, such a conclusion would be devastating for those people living in countries that will need future humanitarian rescue by the United States (Roth, 2004). In contrast, if the findings relative to US interventions align with liberal arguments on saving innocent lives, it would solidify the image of the United States as a firm defender of human rights. Accordingly, future US humanitarian operations would be welcome and would constitute

legitimate and even moral foreign policy tools, which could help the United States promote its leadership role as a benign hegemon.¹

What is US humanitarian military intervention?

The term intervention conveys many different things to many different people. As Little (1987: 49) puts it, “intervention has always been and remains an imprecise and extremely ambiguous concept”. For analytical clarity, this study relies on the definition of military intervention that is used in the studies of Pearson and Baumann (1993a, b) and Pickering and Kisangani (2009). An intervention is referred to as the movement of the regular troops or forces of one country into the territory or territorial waters of another country, or as aggressive military exploits by troops already stationed by one country inside another. In order to differentiate fully fledged military interventions from minor border encounters, or shooting incidences, “regular troops” do not include paramilitary forces and “military exploits” do not include actions by border guards or police; this definition helps avoid conflating the effects of small-scale border skirmishes or actions undertaken by paramilitary forces with the consequences of sustained military interventions. Because of its inherent precision, this definition of military intervention has become one of the most authoritative definitions in the literature (e.g. Pickering and Kisangani, 2010).

A humanitarian military intervention is referred to as a type of foreign military intervention that responds to a situation in which a government severely represses the human rights of its own people; thus, it intends “to save lives, relieve suffering, and/or distribute foodstuffs to prevent starvation” (Pickering and Kisangani, 2009: 593). A US humanitarian intervention is then an intervention conducted by a US military force in conjunction with a humanitarian mission. Put differently, Pickering and Kisangani (2009) have identified all those cases where the United States has explicitly invoked humanitarian grounds in justifying an intervention. For example, the US military interventions in Somalia, particularly during the period from late 1992 through October 1993, and in Haiti, which began in 1994, are considered to be humanitarian in nature since US soldiers were dispatched to protect the victims of human rights abuses (see Hallenberg, 2002).

Since Pickering and Kisangani identify a humanitarian intervention according to its stated goal (i.e. saving lives and relieving suffering), one may view the stated goal as rhetoric, which is being used to justify the intervention and, thus, may not reflect the real motivations of the intervening country. However, by placing a special focus on US humanitarian interventions, the empirical research presented here attempts to examine the question of whether or not US interventions have been based solely on rhetoric. In other words, if the empirical evidence indicates that the stated goal of an intervention is positively correlated with humanitarian factors, it would imply that US administrators do respond more to humanitarian pressures than to national self-interests. More importantly, if this research considers all US interventions, regardless of the stated goal, and then controls for possible explanatory variables, including humanitarian factors, it should generate results that provide information on the nature of the determinants for US intervention in general. As a result, this approach will fail to detect the real motivations of US humanitarian interventions in particular.

Contending theoretical perspectives on US humanitarian military intervention

There are various theoretical perspectives on why nation-states intervene militarily in response to human rights crises. For example, while human rights may be a strategic concern for realists who

consider human rights abuses as a destabilizing factor in regional conflicts, liberals are likely to view human rights abuses as a moral concern and Marxists tend to relate the issue of human rights to ideological tensions. However, most scholarly debates on US humanitarian intervention revolve around two distinct issues, namely, humanitarianism and national interests. Accordingly, this study categorizes the varying perspectives into two competing groups: liberals vs realists. While this approach is parsimonious at the expense of a more detailed and nuanced discussion of each perspective, it is suitable for the subsequent empirical analysis, which purports to find the general pattern of US humanitarian intervention rather than its particulars. This study argues that, while liberals appear to agree that the main purpose of humanitarian military interventions is the preservation of human security, realists refer to national self-interests as being the primary motives of intervening states.

While acknowledging that state sovereignty remains a guiding norm in international affairs, liberals view human rights as an important issue to be addressed in order to create a more peaceful world (Karl and Schmitter, 1994). Drawing on the Kantian justification for humanitarian intervention, which can be traced back to the just war theory, liberals underscore the legitimacy of the use of military force against countries in which massive human rights violations are witnessed (Hoffmann, 1996; Pease and Forsythe, 1993; Roberts, 1993; Walzer, 1977). For instance, Talbott (2005) believes that universal human rights represent the minimal necessary and sufficient conditions for political legitimacy. When massacres or genocides occur among opposing ethnic groups in a country, humanitarian intervention from the outside is justifiable if it has the potential to stop the killing (Kurth, 2006). Talentino (2005) asserts that standards of human rights have become part of the definition of international security since the collapse of the Cold War. Bagnoli's (2006: 118–119) moral argument goes one step further: “there is a strict moral duty to intervene when fundamental human rights are violated ... to protect the victims and to coerce the wrongdoer ... [these] duties follow from respect for humanity and hence are a matter of justice, not of mercy”. Overall, liberal perspectives advance the argument that the United States is justified in launching a humanitarian intervention abroad in response to humanitarian catastrophes, even if such catastrophes are not related to vital US interests. In fact, Pearson et al. (1994: 208) observe that “humanitarian motives usually do little to further interveners’ power interests”, rather, they are invoked against governments that severely violate the human rights of their citizens. Although Beardsley and Schmidt's (2012) study is not directly related to US humanitarian interventions, it implies that, as a key member of the international community, the United States is more inclined to engage in international humanitarian and security-related issues for the sake of world peace rather than for the purpose of seeking its own parochial interests.

Realists discredit the assumption that sovereign nation-states should rely on liberal norms, such as morality and ethics, in the process of foreign policy decision-making. Instead they cite the struggle for power and the advancement of national interests as the core reasons for humanitarian military interventions. The expression “what’s in it for us?” captures the rationale utilized by realists to explain why nation-states use humanitarianism as a pretext for military intervention (Regan, 2000). In his *Foreign Affairs* article, “To Intervene or Not to Intervene”, Hans J. Morgenthau (1967: 429) writes “all nations will continue to be guided in their decisions to intervene and their choice of means of intervention by what they regard as their respective national interests”. Realists emphasize that morality has no bearing on military engagement in the first place, and that humanitarian intervention is another foreign policy tool that is used to promote national security interests or to pursue economic interests involving natural resources such as oil, iron and copper. From this point of view, the United States has been perceived as deploying armed forces overseas in order to advance its political or economic position in the world, rather than to prevent massive human rights

abuses. Along this line, realists contend that national interests were pursued in many of those cases where the US government invoked humanitarianism to justify its military operations. In fact, some realist examples of such actions include the US interventions in Somalia for the purpose of exporting US values,² the intervention in Haiti to discourage a massive flood of refugees, the incursion into Bosnia and Kosovo to preserve NATO's political credibility (and avoid destabilizing Europe), and the invasion of Iraq in 2003 in order to secure the US oil supply (Binder, 2009: 330; see also Finnemore, 2003).³

Research design

For empirical analysis, this study collected cross-national, time-series data for 153 countries during the period from 1981 to 2005. As the geographical location of a conflict is an important factor in American foreign policy decision-making, the unit of analysis is the country-year. The number of sample countries and the period examined in this study are confined by the human rights data, which is available only after 1981 (Cingranelli and Richards, 2010), and the US military intervention data, which ends in 2005 (Pearson and Baumann, 1993a, b; Kisangani and Pickering, 2008; Pickering and Kisangani, 2009).

As noted earlier, humanitarian military activities range from efforts to save lives that are put at risk by the commitment of human atrocities (e.g. through armed force), and efforts to relieve local suffering (e.g. food delivery and/or medical supplies), to the provision of logistic support (e.g. airlift operations in flood zones; Pickering and Kisangani, 2009: 593). If the United States has dispatched armed forces to a country in support of one or more of these humanitarian missions, it is classified as a US humanitarian military intervention. Historically, the United States has only conducted one humanitarian intervention within a single country in a single year except on two occasions.⁴ The dependent variable, US humanitarian intervention, is a dichotomous measure with "1" indicating the occurrence of a US humanitarian intervention and "0" its absence.⁵ Data for this variable comes from two different but related sources. The Pearson and Baumann (1993a) data covers the period from 1946 to 1988, while the data by Kisangani and Pickering (2008) covers the period from 1989 to 2005. Rather than splitting the temporal domain, the two datasets conceptualize and operationalize humanitarian military interventions through identical criteria.⁶

Within the context of humanitarian motives, there may be underlying, mixed and conflictual motives. Organizational and bureaucratic politics, media framing and discourse competition, as well as other factors, shift and shape the conceptions of both interests and ideas and probably give us insights as to why certain motives win out over others. For example, the case of Bosnia in 1995 was a classic case of humanitarian intervention in response to the events at Srebrenica. On the other hand, it may be argued that the United States had a strategic interest to intervene to rescue NATO from its disastrous response: the very future of NATO was at risk if Bosnia had descended further into violence. However, since the main purpose of this study is to predict humanitarian intervention, mixed or multiple motives are disaggregated and only those cases considered to be a humanitarian mission are recorded as "1". Put differently, this study does not intend to examine all the possible nuances of US military interventions, as this would require a new paper.

To capture liberal arguments with respect to preserving human rights, this study utilizes the Cingranelli-Richards index of physical integrity rights, one of the most widely used indices in the human rights literature. This is an additive index based on the occurrence of torture, extrajudicial killings, political imprisonment and disappearances, which represent the most extreme dimensions of human rights violations. It ranges from "0" (no government respect for these four rights) to "8" (full government respect for these four rights).⁷ In order to facilitate easy interpretation of the

estimated coefficient, the original ranking from 0 to 8 is reversed here with “0” corresponding to the fewest human rights violations and “8” corresponding to the most human right violations; this implies that human rights violations should be associated with a higher risk of US humanitarian intervention.

Since the ulterior motives for US humanitarian intervention, from the realist perspectives, are not easy to measure with a single indicator, this study relies on three different measures associated with the attributes of states in which an intervention occurs that may incite US military actions, namely, oil production, alliances and geographical distance. The choice of these three factors is motivated by the fact that previous studies have often identified them as key realist variables (e.g. Beardsley and Schmidt, 2012). Securing a reliable and cheap oil supply is considered to be a vital national interest of the United States, one that is essential for continued economic growth and military operations (see Kraemer, 2006; Peters, 2003). Fordham (2008: 742) argues that “the need to ensure continuing access to the region’s oil resources might help explain current American security commitments in the Persian region”. For the purposes of estimation, a dummy for oil-exporting countries is included. When a country’s oil exports exceed one-third of export revenues, it is coded as “1”. The same measure is found in Fearon and Laitin’s (2003) study.⁸ The data is collected from the World Bank (2010). The oil variable should be positively related to US humanitarian intervention.

Alliances are a key concept for realists since they involve sharing common strategic and security interests for political reasons (Choi and James, 2003; Russett and Oneal, 2001). The United States should be more willing to engage in a humanitarian mission for the purpose of providing assistance to troubled allies, as it treats its friends and enemies differently. It is likely that the United States uses humanitarian interventions in international crises involving its allies to protect vested interests that the United States has in the outcomes of such conflicts (Beardsley and Schmidt, 2012). The alliance variable is coded as “1” if a country is militarily allied with the United States. The data is gathered from the Correlates of War Formal Alliance dataset; this dataset identifies each formal alliance between at least two states, which falls into the class of a defense pact, neutrality or non-aggression treaty, or entente agreement (Gibler and Sarkees, 2004). The alliance variable should be positively associated with US humanitarian intervention.

The empirical literature on international conflict shows that geographical proximity has the greatest and most consistent influence on the likelihood that a military intervention will occur (Choi and James, 2005; Choi, 2011). Although the United States is more capable of waging long-distance battles than other major powers, it should still be less likely to engage in a humanitarian intervention when there is a significant geographical distance between the United States and the other country involved. The geographical distance variable measures the distance between Washington, DC and the capital of the other state. However, if the United States and the other state are contiguous, in terms of distance as measured on land, then the distance is zero, regardless of the distance between their capitals. This data is collected using the EUGene Software, Version 3.204 (Bennett and Stam, 2000). The geographical distance variable should decrease the chance of a US humanitarian intervention.

To avoid omitted variable bias, this study includes four control variables—democracy, economic development, regime durability and Post-Cold War—and a lagged term for US humanitarian intervention. When the United States employs its military abroad in order to protect human rights, it also aims at advancing or defending democracy as a system of government. For example, the absence of democracy in Haiti was one of the principal considerations involved in the US humanitarian intervention in this country (Kurth, 2006; Pearson et al., 2006). Democracy is operationalized with the Polity dataset, ranging from full democracy (+10) to full autocracy (−10) (see

Marshall and Jagers, 2007). The democracy variable should reduce the likelihood of US humanitarian intervention.

Highly developed countries commonly have fewer people who live below the poverty line; as such, they can better address basic human needs like clean water, nutrition, health care, education, clothing and shelter. Accordingly, people in developed economies usually feel less desperate because of the abundance of economic resources; they are, therefore, less prone to stealing, killing, theft, sexual assault and prostitution. In contrast, poor countries suffer from an array of political and social problems that are caused by economic deprivation (Hallenberg, 2002). In this case, the United States may be more likely to intervene militarily in order to alleviate those conditions experienced by poor people in underdeveloped countries. Economic development is measured through the logged yearly value of a country's gross domestic product (GDP) per capita, adjusted for purchasing power parity (PPP). Data for this variable is derived from Gleditsch (2002) and has been updated with base data from the new 6.3 version of the Penn World Tables (Heston et al., 2009).

Countries with stable regimes are less likely to experience an outside military intervention because they appear to have immunity from the resultant ills of political instability (Oseghale, 1993). The regime durability variable measures the number of years a country has gone without experiencing a regime change, measured as a three-point shift in a country's Polity score for a given year. Data for this variable is collected from Marshall and Jagers's (2007) Polity dataset. It is expected that regime durability will have a dampening effect with respect to a potential US humanitarian military intervention.

Binder (2009: 339) notes that humanitarian military intervention has occurred more frequently since the end of the Cold War. Similarly, Talentino (2005) maintains that standards of human rights and responsible governance have been factored into foreign decision-making processes since the demise of the Cold War. In this context, it is important to examine whether or not humanitarian motives are new in the context of the post-Cold War era or more deeply rooted historically. To capture the different dynamics between the Cold War era and the post-Cold War era, a Post-Cold War variable is included. A "0" is assigned to the period from 1981 to 1990 and "1" thereafter. The post-Cold War variable is projected to have a positive effect upon the likelihood of a US humanitarian intervention.

Previous research demonstrates that countries that have used intervention in the past are more likely than other countries to use it in the present or in the future (Pickering and Kisangani, 2010). Accordingly, this study controls for the past history of US humanitarian interventions by adding a lagged dependent variable on the right-hand side of the equation. It is important to note that the lagged dependent variable has the potential to "soak up" the explanatory power of other independent variables (Achen, 2000).

The dependent variable is dichotomous, so this study fits the humanitarian intervention data with logit regression. Existing empirical studies report logit results and then move on to other tests for robustness (e.g. Fearon and Laitin, 2003); this study follows suit. The standard logit model employed in this study is less capable of dealing with the autoregressive nature of the intervention data, despite the fact that the use of the lagged dependent variable should attenuate autoregression. To address the issue of autoregression in a more direct way, this study later excludes the lagged dependent variable from the right-hand side of the empirical model and, instead, uses two advanced estimation methods: logit splines and generalized estimating equations (GEEs). Beck et al.'s (1998) study develops logit splines in an attempt to control for temporal dependence in the conflict data and their estimator also uses robust standard errors to correct heteroskedasticity. Zorn's (2001) study designs GEEs to correct for first-order autocorrelation as well as heteroskedasticity. In order

to ensure that the predictors are the causes of the outcome variable, rather than the other way around, all the predictors are lagged one year behind the outcome variable.

Empirical findings

Table 1 reports the first set of empirical results. Model 1 is a basic model that examines the effects of three main variables: physical integrity rights, oil supply and a lagged term for the dependent variable. The results exhibit evidence that massive human rights violations, as measured by physical integrity rights, are a cause of US humanitarian intervention since its coefficient is significant and the sign is positive. As the status of human rights deteriorates in other countries, the United States is more likely to use the military for humanitarian purposes in those countries. This implies that, when the United States declares humanitarian missions, it really means to save innocent lives, minimize human suffering and prevent further human atrocities. This finding is consistent with liberal perspectives. The 1992 US humanitarian intervention in Somalia, which was torn by famine and civil war between clan warlords, and the 1994 intervention into Haiti, whose mission was to establish order and humanitarian services, are two cases in point. Although these interventions were of no clear strategic value to the United States and the ultimate outcome was not obvious, US troops were deployed to deliver economic aid to those in need as well as to protect aid workers (Finnemore, 2003; Hallenberg, 2002; Österdahl, 2002). Because the oil supply variable fails to achieve significance in Model 1, it is fair to say that US troops were not sent in to secure the economic interests of the United States in the oil supply.

Model 2 extends Model 1 by including control variables. While the coefficient on physical integrity rights is statistically different from zero, the coefficient for oil supply is not. The other two realist variables, alliance and geographical distance, also fail to achieve significance. These findings again go against realist contentions concerning the possible hidden agendas of American foreign policy. All the control variables, except for the lagged term for US humanitarian intervention, fail to exhibit independent effects. As noted, the insignificance of the control variables may be attributed to the inclusion of the lagged term for the dependent variable on the right-hand side of Model 2; this absorbs the explanatory power of the controls and consequently causes them to become statistically insignificant (Achen, 2000).⁹ The overall results of Model 2 can be used in further evaluating the relative importance of liberal vs realist perspectives on US humanitarian intervention. Given the fact that the former (i.e. physical integrity rights) is statistically significant, while the latter (oil supply, alliances and geographical proximity) is not, this study concludes that the liberal arguments are more convincing: US foreign interventions are, on average, carried out for humanitarian purposes rather than for political or economic reasons.¹⁰

It is possible that not all the sample countries that are used for estimation in Model 2 have the same probability of motivating the United States to dispatch humanitarian troops. Since well-institutionalized countries such as OECD members hardly ever commit human rights violations, they are much less likely to incite US humanitarian intervention. For this reason, this study creates two sub-samples: (1) non-OECD countries; and (2) only those countries which actually commit human rights violations. Because the estimated results from these two different sub-samples are substantively the same, this study discusses only the latter case of human rights abusers as a way of saving space. Model 3 is built from of Model 2, after excluding those countries that have no record of human rights violations, in order to obtain the estimated coefficients and standard errors. The results in Model 3 are not different from those in Model 2, that is, US military forces are likely to be deployed in order to promote and defend human rights in other countries.¹¹

Table 1. Determinants of US humanitarian intervention, 1981–2005.

Variable	Logistic regression							
	Oil supply				Primary commodity exports			
	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4	Model 5	Model 6	Model 7	Model 8
Physical integrity rights _{t-1}	0.430*** (0.106)	0.460*** (0.115)	0.426*** (0.120)	0.297* (0.171)	0.436*** (0.110)	0.451*** (0.115)	0.417*** (0.119)	0.293* (0.172)
Oil supply _{t-1}	-0.797 (0.762)	-0.896 (0.844)	-0.900 (0.847)	n/a ^a				
Primary commodity exports _{t-1}					0.627 (1.306)	0.563 (1.472)	0.568 (1.466)	-0.519 (3.161)
Alliances _{t-1}		-0.027 (0.724)	-0.010 (0.720)	1.135 (1.233)		0.115 (0.740)	0.128 (0.739)	1.110 (1.242)
Geographical distance _{t-1}		0.075 (0.287)	0.069 (0.287)	-0.132 (0.264)		0.092 (0.298)	0.086 (0.298)	-0.135 (0.264)
Democracy _{t-1}		0.004 (0.045)	0.008 (0.045)	0.074 (0.082)		0.023 (0.042)	0.027 (0.043)	0.074 (0.082)
Economic development _{t-1}		0.149 (0.337)	0.134 (0.337)	-1.280* (0.636)		-0.014 (0.335)	-0.029 (0.336)	-1.261* (0.651)
Regime durability _{t-1}		0.005 (0.011)	0.007 (0.012)	0.019 (0.016)		0.006 (0.011)	0.007 (0.012)	0.019 (0.016)
Post-Cold War _{t-1}		0.044 (0.521)	0.011 (0.522)	-0.220 (0.805)		0.039 (0.523)	0.003 (0.525)	-0.214 (0.804)
US humanitarian intervention _{t-1}	4.603*** (0.597)	4.662*** (0.628)	4.653*** (0.625)	3.397*** (1.019)	4.667*** (0.588)	4.651*** (0.615)	4.642*** (0.612)	3.378*** (1.025)
Media coverage _{t-1}				0.238*** (0.085)				0.237*** (0.086)
Constant	-7.075*** (0.641)	-9.235* (4.002)	-8.858* (4.032)	3.361 (5.724)	-7.378*** (0.786)	-8.353* (4.026)	-7.970* (4.064)	3.354 (5.757)
LR χ^2	76.72	77.56	71.54	38.88	75.61	76.37	70.35	38.90
Prob > χ^2	0.001	0.001	0.001	0.001	0.001	0.001	0.001	0.001
Log likelihood	-97.31	-96.89	-96.32	-43.22	-97.86	-97.48	-96.91	-43.20
Pseudo R ²	0.28	0.29	0.27	0.31	0.28	0.28	0.27	0.31
Observations	3096	3096	2651	1940	3096	3096	2651	1940

Note: * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$, one-tailed tests.

^a Because oil predicts the failure of the dependent variable perfectly for the years 1986–2000, it is not included for estimation.

LR, Likelihood ratio.

Upon reviewing existing studies on the mass media-foreign policy connection, Baum and Potter (2008: 39) conclude that “the mass media ... plays a critical role alongside citizens and elites in shaping the public attitudes about, and influence on, foreign policy”. In a similar vein, Soderlund et al. (2008) scrutinized news stories related to 10 humanitarian crises in the 1990s; their content analysis shows the important role that the media plays in advocating for, or cautioning against, military intervention. Given that these previous studies underscored the salience of mass media in shaping foreign policy, this study tested its effect on US humanitarian interventions using Ron

et al.'s (2005) media coverage data.¹² Ron et al. count the total number of articles mentioning the term "human rights" in the *Economist* (international edition) and *Newsweek* (US edition) within a specific country in a given year; they then take the country-year average to avoid collinearity, thus producing a broad measure of media influence.

Because of the limited availability of the data, Model 4 shows the effect of media coverage only for the years 1986–2000, which is 10 years shorter than that used in the previous three models. Because the oil supply variable perfectly predicts the failure (i.e. recorded as "0" in the data) of the dependent variable, US humanitarian intervention, during the shorter study period, it is not included for estimation. Model 4 reveals that media coverage is statistically significant with a positive sign. At the same time, the physical integrity rights variable still achieves significance with a positive sign; this implies that, although media attention serves as an important factor which US leaders consider (when deciding to launch military campaigns), human rights violations are also a clear predictor of US humanitarian intervention, as laid out in liberal arguments. In short, media coverage fails to serve as an effective confounding variable since it does not cause physical integrity rights to become insignificant.

A concern may arise that the oil supply variable is operationalized too narrowly to capture the general national interests of the United States. In this sense, this study may need to find better realist measures. Because several existing studies use the ratio of primary commodity exports and GDP, as a proxy for the abundance of natural resources (e.g. Fearon and Laitin, 2003), this study employs the same measure as another proxy for realist arguments. Models 5–8 are built to account for the aforementioned concern by adopting the same model specifications as Models 1–4, except for the inclusion of primary commodity exports, which is a replacement for the oil variable. The data on primary commodity exports and GDP is collected from the World Bank (2010). The results of Models 5–8 do not substantively deviate from those of Models 1–4. While realist contentions are not supported, as indicated by the insignificant coefficients with respect to the three realist-related variables including primary commodity exports, liberal arguments are supported, as shown by the significance of physical integrity rights.¹³

It is plausible that alternative statistical estimation techniques may make the significance of physical integrity rights disappear if this factor is not robust. Table 2 evaluates the robustness of the results reported in Models 2 and 6 in Table 1 by performing three other advanced statistical estimations, that is, logistic regression models with peace-years correction (a.k.a., logit splines), rare event logit and GEEs. As noted earlier, logit splines are designed to control for temporal dependence and use robust standard errors to correct heteroskedasticity. GEEs correct for first-order autocorrelation as well as for heteroskedasticity. A rare event logit model is introduced to address the issue of excessive zeros that are present in the intervention data. Overall, irrespective of estimation methods, the aggravating effect of the physical integrity rights variable on US humanitarian intervention is confirmed in a consistent manner, while oil supply or primary commodity exports have little relation to the initiation of a US military action.

This study now turns to the Political Terror Scale (PTS) in order to perform another test of robustness regarding the connection between human rights violations and US humanitarian interventions; this alternative data collection set is utilized since the PTS is also commonly used in the human rights literature (Wood and Gibney, 2010). The PTS ranges from 1 to 5, with "1" indicating countries with the highest quality of human rights protections, and "5" denoting countries where unrestrained political terror is used against the entire population by the government. Table 3 reports the empirical results that are obtained using the Amnesty International scores of the PTS. The overall results are similar to those in Tables 1 and 2: humanitarian norms rather than national interests matter for inciting a US military action.

Table 2. Determinants of US humanitarian intervention, 1981–2005: robustness tests.

Variable	Logit splines		Rare event logit		GEEs	
	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4	Model 5	Model 6
Physical integrity rights _{t-1}	0.513*** (0.101)	0.511*** (0.106)	0.437*** (0.080)	0.429*** (0.078)	0.506*** (0.114)	0.487*** (0.112)
Oil supply _{t-1}	-0.741 (0.724)		-0.676 (0.756)		-0.975 (0.730)	
Primary commodity exports _{t-1}		0.602 (1.469)		0.912 (1.191)		0.408 (1.393)
Alliances _{t-1}	0.713 (0.624)	0.851 (0.655)	-0.182 (0.517)	-0.061 (0.547)	0.274 (0.738)	0.399 (0.765)
Geographical distance _{t-1}	0.068 (0.153)	0.095 (0.153)	-0.192* (0.102)	-0.189* (0.103)	0.035 (0.131)	0.061 (0.129)
Democracy _{t-1}	0.034 (0.044)	0.045 (0.046)	0.006 (0.043)	0.024 (0.043)	0.030 (0.044)	0.043 (0.046)
Economic deveopment _{t-1}	-0.022 (0.292)	-0.116 (0.272)	0.139 (0.344)	-0.021 (0.358)	0.109 (0.331)	-0.016 (0.298)
Regime durability _{t-1}	0.007 (0.012)	0.007 (0.012)	0.008 (0.014)	0.008 (0.014)	-0.001 (0.017)	0.000 (0.016)
Post-Cold War _{t-1}	0.833 (0.625)	0.851 (0.641)	0.027 (0.463)	0.013 (0.482)	-0.190 (0.653)	-0.207 (0.662)
US humanitarian intervention _{t-1}			4.413*** (0.576)	4.409*** (0.542)		
Constant	-6.705* (3.229)	-6.457* (3.120)	-6.335* (3.465)	-5.398 (3.397)	-8.241** (3.317)	-7.649** (3.068)
Wald χ^2	71.35	72.21			38.39	40.12
Prob > χ^2	0.001	0.001			0.001	0.001
Log likelihood	-108.98	-109.42				
Pseudo R ²	0.20	0.19				
Observations	3096	3096	3096	3096	3096	3096

Note: numbers in parentheses are robust standard errors.

* $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$, one-tailed tests.

By restricting the empirical analysis to only those countries that engage in political terror, Table 4 attempts to further scrutinize the question of what causes a US humanitarian intervention; this is consistent with the rationale for introducing Models 3 and 7 in Table 1. This more nuanced analysis is done by eliminating the inclusion of countries that have a score “1” on the political terror scale.¹⁴ According to Wood and Gibney (2010: 373), the score of “1” is referred to as representing “countries ... under a secure rule of law, people are not imprisoned for their views, and torture is rare or exceptional ... Political murders are extremely rare”. The results in Table 4 are almost identical to those in Table 3. Regardless of the different estimation methods, the political terror scale variable is statistically significant with a positive sign, while none of the realist variables achieves significance in a consistent manner. The implication is that a US humanitarian intervention is more likely to occur when the quality of human rights in other countries deteriorates, but not when there is an abundance of natural resources or security concerns.

Table 3. Determinants of US humanitarian intervention, 1981–2005: Political Terror Scale.

Variable	Logit		Logit splines		Rare event logit		GEEs	
	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4	Model 5	Model 6	Model 7	Model 8
Political Terror Scale _{t-1}	0.896*** (0.236)	0.895*** (0.238)	1.120*** (0.243)	1.130*** (0.255)	0.848*** (0.185)	0.850*** (0.190)	1.091*** (0.275)	1.087*** (0.292)
Oil supply _{t-1}	-0.813 (0.837)		-0.648 (0.721)		-0.600 (0.763)		-0.895 (0.705)	
Primary commodity exports _{t-1}		0.834 (1.376)		0.758 (1.183)		1.199 (1.053)		1.037 (1.264)
Alliances _{t-1}	0.028 (0.720)	0.177 (0.741)	0.529 (0.591)	0.655 (0.601)	-0.176 (0.507)	-0.047 (0.539)	0.200 (0.714)	0.361 (0.734)
Geographical distance _{t-1}	0.045 (0.324)	0.058 (0.337)	0.004 (0.186)	0.018 (0.182)	-0.272* (0.136)	-0.276* (0.139)	-0.034 (0.147)	-0.019 (0.145)
Democracy _{t-1}	-0.001 (0.045)	0.018 (0.042)	0.032 (0.042)	0.042 (0.043)	0.000 (0.046)	0.017 (0.044)	0.024 (0.042)	0.041 (0.046)
Economic development _{t-1}	0.073 (0.325)	-0.086 (0.329)	-0.076 (0.280)	-0.164 (0.262)	0.079 (0.308)	-0.078 (0.336)	0.046 (0.328)	-0.105 (0.304)
Regime durability _{t-1}	0.007 (0.011)	0.008 (0.011)	0.006 (0.014)	0.007 (0.013)	0.009 (0.014)	0.009 (0.014)	0.003 (0.017)	0.003 (0.016)
Post-Cold War _{t-1}	0.072 (0.519)	0.049 (0.519)	0.690 (0.632)	0.713 (0.642)	0.057 (0.480)	0.026 (0.485)	-0.213 (0.658)	-0.264 (0.666)
US humanitarian intervention _{t-1}	4.235*** (0.632)	4.216*** (0.618)			4.000*** (0.600)	3.983*** (0.553)		
Constant	-9.147* (4.147)	-8.328* (4.210)	-6.981* (3.168)	-6.735* (3.008)	-5.850* (3.208)	-4.948 (3.202)	-8.351*** (3.177)	-7.651*** (2.960)
LR χ^2	71.92	71.17						
Wald χ^2			61.55	60.96			38.10	35.15
Prob > χ^2	0.001	0.001	0.001	0.001			0.001	0.001
Log likelihood	-95.83	-96.21	-105.02	-105.26				
Pseudo R ²	0.27	0.27	0.20	0.20				
Observations	2618	2618	2618	2618	2618	2618	2618	2618

Note: numbers in parentheses are robust standard errors except for the logit models.

* $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$, one-tailed tests.

It is possible that, as a sample size increases, a small effect can be statistically significant even though it may not be a meaningful finding. Consequently, it is important to estimate the substantive effects of variables as the sample size increases. When the substantive effects of the physical integrity rights variable and the political terror scale variable in Tables 1–4 are examined, they turn out to be consistent with the statistically significant effects. As a specific example, when the substantive effects of the physical integrity rights variable (whose coefficient is 0.460) in Model 2 in Table 1 are calculated, this study finds evidence that, as compared with a typical country, human rights abusers are more likely to experience a US humanitarian intervention. A change of 1 standard deviation in the physical integrity rights variable increases the likelihood of a US military action by 197%, and a change of 2 standard deviations increases it by 761%.

To capture liberal arguments for preserving human rights, this study utilizes the physical integrity rights measure and the political terror scale, as these are two of the most widely used indices

Table 4. US humanitarian intervention when Political Terror Scale ≥ 2 .

Variable	Logit		Logit splines		Rare event logit		GEEs	
	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4	Model 5	Model 6	Model 7	Model 8
Political Terror Scale _{t-1}	0.844*** (0.245)	0.846*** (0.246)	1.097*** (0.261)	1.106*** (0.274)	0.801*** (0.197)	0.807*** (0.201)	1.046*** (0.295)	1.043*** (0.312)
Oil supply _{t-1}	-0.828 (0.839)		-0.656 (0.721)		-0.615 (0.766)		-0.895 (0.702)	
Primary commodity exports _{t-1}		0.812 (1.378)		0.713 (1.197)		1.192 (1.049)		1.024 (1.262)
Alliances _{t-1}	0.059 (0.723)	0.201 (0.743)	0.560 (0.589)	0.683 (0.600)	-0.161 (0.505)	-0.038 (0.535)	0.216 (0.712)	0.370 (0.731)
Geographical distance _{t-1}	0.036 (0.332)	0.051 (0.345)	-0.007 (0.195)	0.009 (0.191)	-0.289* (0.143)	-0.292* (0.145)	-0.039 (0.154)	-0.023 (0.151)
Democracy _{t-1}	0.001 (0.044)	0.020 (0.042)	0.031 (0.041)	0.041 (0.042)	0.002 (0.045)	0.019 (0.044)	0.025 (0.042)	0.042 (0.045)
Economic development _{t-1}	0.076 (0.323)	-0.082 (0.327)	-0.090 (0.275)	-0.174 (0.259)	0.084 (0.305)	-0.073 (0.334)	0.048 (0.328)	-0.101 (0.303)
Regime durability _{t-1}	0.008 (0.011)	0.009 (0.011)	0.007 (0.014)	0.008 (0.013)	0.010 (0.014)	0.010 (0.014)	0.004 (0.017)	0.005 (0.016)
Post-Cold War _{t-1}	0.090 (0.519)	0.063 (0.518)	0.637 (0.622)	0.659 (0.633)	0.074 (0.478)	0.039 (0.481)	-0.204 (0.663)	-0.257 (0.669)
US humanitarian intervention _{t-1}	4.238*** (0.628)	4.216*** (0.614)			4.001*** (0.590)	3.981*** (0.545)		
Constant	-8.916* (4.206)	-8.125* (4.269)	-6.713* (3.233)	-6.508* (3.079)	-5.561* (3.263)	-4.688 (3.255)	-8.162** (3.243)	-7.490** (3.003)
LR χ^2	67.02	66.21						
Wald χ^2			49.38	48.09			29.00	26.62
Prob > χ^2	0.001	0.001	0.001	0.001			0.001	0.001
Log likelihood	-95.44	-95.85	-105.03	-105.30				
Pseudo R ²	0.26	0.26	0.19	0.18				
Observations	2315	2315	2315	2315	2315	2315	2311	2311

Note: numbers in parentheses are robust standard errors except for the logit models.

* $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$, one-tailed tests.

in the human rights literature. However, it would be interesting to add other variables that can be linked to humanitarian missions, such as the number of refugees and the death rate, as part of the robustness tests (see Regan, 2000). The refugee variable records the total number of refugees originating from each country and the number of internally displaced persons per year. In order to correct the positive skew in the data, and to avoid the mathematical problem of log-transforming zeros, this study takes the natural log of the number of refugees, after adding 1 to the base, as implemented in Salehyan and Gleditsch's (2006) study on refugees and the spread of civil war. Data on refugee flows comes from the Population Data Unit of the United States Committee for Refugees and Immigrants' *World Refugee Survey* (Marshall, 2008). The death rate refers to the number of deaths occurring during the year, per a 1000-person population; it is estimated at mid-year. Data is collected from the World Bank (2010). Table 5 presents the results of the robustness

tests. While the number of refugees and the death rate have no bearing on US foreign policy behavior in the context of humanitarianism, physical integrity rights violations are likely to invoke US interventions.¹⁵ This finding appears to support the liberal notion that, of the various humanitarian factors, defending human rights worldwide has become one of the main concerns of US administrations during the past three decades.

Conclusion

The end of the Cold War gave birth to the military hegemony of the United States in the contemporary world, providing it with a unique opportunity to turn to the unilateral use of military force in response to international crises. Of all the possible types of US military interventions, humanitarian missions have emerged as a contentious issue because the real motives behind these incursions are often suspected to be related to issues of national interest and economic considerations. While some international relations theorists point out the ulterior motives behind US humanitarian interventions, others believe a deep respect for human rights is the motivation. Not surprisingly, this controversy has produced a plethora of qualitative works based on case studies and historical examples, as well as case-oriented accounts (e.g. Holzgrefe and Keohane, 2003), while virtually no quantitative analysis has been offered in the literature. This study has sought to fill in the empirical lacuna by comparing the relative explanatory power of the two opposing perspectives on US humanitarian military intervention.

The empirical results presented here show that, when the US intervenes militarily in another sovereign state's internal affairs in the name of human rights protection, it is unlikely to be a façade for a US-led expansion or for national and economic interests such as protecting the oil supply. Instead, US humanitarian intervention appears to be motivated in order to save the many thousands of people who face starvation and death because of political violence. Given the statistical significance of the variables, physical integrity rights and political terror scale, as well as their substantive effects, these findings are consistent and robust. These findings are in line with the liberal explanation for the use of US force, namely, US leaders will answer a call for help based on moral obligations, especially when supported by the international human rights community, by engaging in humanitarian operations. These findings are also in line with Pape's (2012) recollection of three historical examples of US humanitarian interventions—"in 1991, to stop Saddam Hussein's attempted massacre of the Kurds in northern Iraq after the gulf war, and to protect first Bosnians, in 1993, and then Kosovars, in 1999, from the Serbs' attempts at ethnic cleansing".

Therefore, it is fair to state that very few, if any, US humanitarian interventions are due to ulterior motives since none of the realist variables turns out to be statistically significant. Perhaps the United States may have created "a new international standard of civilization" or an international order where liberal norms and rules matter and where the most basic humanitarian standards are applied consistently to other sovereign states (Binder, 2009; Lauren, 2003). In other words, as far as humanitarian military interventions are concerned, the United States appears to have assumed the responsibility of a benevolent hegemon, with benign intentions, during the past three decades.

This study does not claim that the four measures of national interests (i.e. oil production, geographic distance, alliance relationship and primary commodity exports) capture the full extent of how a great power's interests are defined. Accordingly, future research should pay attention to defining and measuring national interest and security motives in order to further delve into the determinants of US humanitarian intervention. US strategic interests may be defined by overall regional influence indicators, such as US base locations, arms transfers, regional or nearby levels of international terrorism and geographic proximity to key regional actors and powers, such as

Table 5. Determinants of US humanitarian intervention, 1981–2005: refugees and death rate.

Variable	Logit		Logit splines		Rare event logit		GEEs	
	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4	Model 5	Model 6	Model 7	Model 8
Physical integrity rights _{t-1}	0.400** (0.145)	0.381** (0.143)	0.398*** (0.109)	0.394*** (0.108)	0.382*** (0.117)	0.362*** (0.112)	0.422*** (0.114)	0.400*** (0.108)
Refugees _{t-1}	0.098 (0.103)	0.113 (0.102)	0.160 (0.124)	0.174 (0.123)	0.091 (0.084)	0.108 (0.085)	0.146 (0.118)	0.162 (0.122)
Death rate _{t-1}	0.040 (0.052)	0.040 (0.052)	0.041 (0.040)	0.042 (0.043)	0.042 (0.084)	0.043 (0.083)	0.064 (0.042)	0.064 (0.047)
Oil supply _{t-1}	-0.822 (0.851)		-0.608 (0.742)		-0.590 (0.746)		-0.875 (0.755)	
Primary commodity exports _{t-1}		0.659 (1.414)		0.889 (1.396)		0.986 (1.154)		0.735 (1.387)
Alliances _{t-1}	-0.001 (0.727)	0.161 (0.743)	0.912 (0.741)	1.055 (0.741)	-0.175 (0.541)	-0.030 (0.576)	0.428 (0.807)	0.611 (0.841)
Geographical distance _{t-1}	0.064 (0.295)	0.074 (0.305)	0.056 (0.155)	0.071 (0.155)	-0.216* (0.109)	-0.220* (0.110)	0.002 (0.140)	0.014 (0.139)
Democracy _{t-1}	0.002 (0.046)	0.020 (0.044)	0.028 (0.044)	0.038 (0.047)	0.003 (0.046)	0.020 (0.045)	0.033 (0.051)	0.046 (0.052)
Economic development _{t-1}	0.337 (0.380)	0.169 (0.374)	0.143 (0.274)	0.045 (0.250)	0.330 (0.356)	0.168 (0.365)	0.336 (0.330)	0.177 (0.301)
Regime durability _{t-1}	0.005 (0.011)	0.006 (0.011)	0.007 (0.012)	0.009 (0.012)	0.007 (0.014)	0.009 (0.014)	-0.000 (0.016)	0.002 (0.015)
Post-Cold War _{t-1}	0.029 (0.523)	0.007 (0.528)	0.601 (0.689)	0.607 (0.698)	0.013 (0.485)	-0.018 (0.505)	-0.257 (0.661)	-0.308 (0.687)
US humanitarian intervention _{t-1}	4.521*** (0.649)	4.503*** (0.638)			4.213*** (0.634)	4.202*** (0.603)		
Constant	-11.007** (4.567)	-10.039* (4.560)	-8.294** (2.947)	-7.985** (2.799)	-7.990* (4.154)	-6.986* (4.046)	-10.482*** (3.298)	-9.595*** (3.071)
LR χ^2	78.85	77.97						
Wald χ^2			84.33	87.75			52.21	51.42
Prob > χ^2	0.001	0.001	0.001	0.001			0.001	0.001
Log likelihood	-95.00	-95.43	-105.85	-105.99				
Pseudo R ²	0.29	0.29	0.21	0.21				
Observations	2933	2933	2933	2933	2933	2933	2933	2933

Note: numbers in parentheses are robust standard errors except for the logit models.

* $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$, one-tailed tests.

Pakistan, Iran, Israel, Saudi Arabia, Russia, Japan and South Korea. By incorporating such a set of interest indicators, future research may further advance our scientific knowledge of the respective paradigms in international relations. From either a theoretical or empirical perspective, the work presented here is not, as Winston Churchill said, “the beginning of the end”—it is more like the “end of the beginning”, as it is the first of its kind to evaluate the relative importance of the competing theoretical perspectives related to US humanitarian intervention.

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Notes

1. The point is important because the image of the United States has been tarnished in the eyes of the world since the beginning of the Iraq War. Because Saddam Hussein's alleged weapons of mass destruction were nowhere to be found, the world has for some time now questioned the legitimacy of the War and American foreign policy, in general, leading to a surge of anti-Americanism (Rubin and Rubin, 2004; for a dissenting view, see Chiozza, 2009).
2. Offensive realist John Mearsheimer (2001; 47), however, notes that "Somalia is the only instance during the past hundred years in which US soldiers were killed in action while on a humanitarian mission".
3. Some critics would say that humanitarian intervention helps facilitate US soft power and, thus, its overall world influence. The argument here is that what appears strictly humanitarian also may contain an element of investment (see Wheeler, 2000).
4. The two occasions were the Lebanese Civil War in 1982 and against the Taliban in Afghanistan in 2001. Each of the two occasions is recorded as "1". Ronald Reagan defended the Lebanon intervention as follows: "If America were to walk away from Lebanon, what chance would there be for a negotiated settlement producing a unified, democratic Lebanon?" (*Congressional Quarterly Weekly Reports* 1983, 2274, quoted in Meernik, 1996: 391).
5. It is tempting to disaggregate US humanitarian interventions by type, such as post-disaster humanitarian aid, natural disasters and military intervention in civil wars, since these types of operations may involve somewhat different decision criteria and agendas for foreign policy decision-makers. However, since there are very few cases of each type, and since the logistic regression modeling that is employed in this study is not suitable for such disaggregated data, this task is left for future research.
6. See <http://www.k-state.edu/polsci/intervention/> (see Pickering and Kisangani, 2009).
7. See ciri.binghamton.edu (see Cingranelli and Richards, 2010).
8. When the dummy oil variable is replaced with fuel exports as a percentage of merchandise exports or fuel export divided by GDP, the results are similar to those reported below.
9. It is possible, however, that multicollinearity may be to blame for the insignificance of the control variables. This study has conducted three sets of rigorous diagnostic tests for multicollinearity: variance inflation factors (VIFs), R^2 statistics, eigenvalues and condition index. The test results are found in the Appendix and none of them indicates severe multicollinearity among the predictors. For instance, when the VIF test is used to determine if multicollinearity is a problem in the estimation, this study finds no such concerns since none of the variable's VIFs exceeds the threshold of 10.
10. In order to add confidence in the estimated results, this study has performed a set of diagnostics: a Hosmer–Lemeshow goodness of fit test, a test for linearity (Box–Tidwell), and an analysis of outliers. No concerns are found with these diagnostics. For example, a good fit as measured by Hosmer and Lemeshow's test yields a large p -value, indicating that the model fits the data well.
11. It is interesting to gauge the importance of geopolitics; however, this study finds no particular region over which US humanitarian interventions are more likely to occur.
12. However, media coverage can be considered to be an intervening variable. Abuses have to exist for the media to cover them, so media coverage merely shines the spotlight on or magnifies certain abuses.
13. When a squared term for primary commodity exports is added in Models 5–8, both the squared term and its original term fail to achieve significance.
14. When "1" and "2" together are dropped, the results are similar to those in Table 4.

15. A possible reason for the insignificance of death rate is that it is simply a measure of the number of people that die in the country that year, relative to the population, rather than an indicator of the number of deliberate killings at the hand of the regime.
16. When political terror scale is used as the dependent variable, the results are similar to those reported in Table 5.

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Appendix I

Table A1. Multicollinearity diagnostics^a.

	Variance inflation factors	Tolerance	R ²
Physical integrity rights _{t-1}	1.41	0.71	0.29
Oil supply _{t-1}	1.19	0.84	0.16
Alliances _{t-1}	1.52	0.66	0.34
Geographical distance _{t-1}	1.17	0.86	0.14
Democracy _{t-1}	1.93	0.52	0.48
Economic development _{t-1}	1.91	0.52	0.48
Regime durability _{t-1}	1.27	0.79	0.21
Post-Cold War _{t-1}	1.20	0.84	0.16
US humanitarian intervention _{t-1}	1.01	0.99	0.01
Mean variance inflation factors	1.40		
	Eigenvalues	Condition index	
1	5.32	1.00	
2	1.40	1.95	
3	1.00	2.31	
4	0.72	2.72	
5	0.59	3.00	
6	0.53	3.17	
7	0.22	4.92	
8	0.20	5.16	
9	0.01	21.18	
10	0.00	38.10	
Condition number		38.10	
Eigenvalues and condition index computed from the scaled raw sscp with an intercept.			
Det(correlation matrix)		0.22	

^aA general rule of thumb: a serious multicollinearity problem is suspected if the mean of all the variance inflation factors is considerably larger than 10, if R² is greater than 0.80, or if condition number (that is derived from the eigenvalue) exceeds 1000.